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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
This report presents the results of a two-year effort sponsored by the
NASA Langley Research Center under contract NASI-17411 to develop automatic
control design procedures for restructurable aircraft control systems. The
restructurable aircraft control problem involves designing a fault tolerant
control system which can accommodate a wide variety of unanticipated aircraft
failures. Under NASA sponsorship, ALPHATECH has been developing and testing
many of the technologies which make such a system possible. Future work under
this contract will focus on developing a methodology for integrating these
technologies and demonstration of a complete system.
The automatic control design procedure developed during the first year of
this project [i] assumes that failures are correctly detected and identified
and makes use of feedforward and feedback controls to stabilize the aircraft
and recover as much dynamic performance as is possible. The objectives of the
work reported herein are to (I) thoroughly test the feedback control redesign
procedure under a variety of failure conditions and (2) complete development
of an automatic feedforward "trim" algorithm.
This project was divided into three tasks. Task i involved performing a
complete linearized analysis of the feedback control redesign procedure for
the Boeing 737 aircraft. This included examination of eigenvalues_ singular
*References are indicated by numbers in square brackets; the list appears at
the end of of this report.
i
values and llnear simulations for a variety of failure and control redesign
options. Task 2 was aimed at examining the performance of the various ele-
ments of the overall control redesign procedure on NASA Langley Research
Center's nonlinear slmulation. Finally, Task 3 completed development of an
algorithm to automatically trim the aircraft with feedforward control and
developed the integrated control system redesign procedure.
i.i BACKGROUND
As aircraft become increasingly sophisticated, and as static stability
is decreased in the interests of efficiency and maneuverability, the potential
damage caused by unanticipated failure increases dramatically. Although pilots
can be trained to react in the case of anticipated major failures, they cannot
be expected to respond correctly, and in time, for all conceivable failures.
This is particularly frustrating because modern aircraft, with complex controls,
may remain controllable despite individual failures, as happened recently in
two well publicized cases. In one case, (a Delta LI011 flight [2]) the pilot
was able to reconfigure his available controls to save the plane. In another,
(the Chlcago DCIO crash [3]) the pilot could not, although hindsight revealed
the plane could have been saved.
The objective of a restructurable control system is to automatically and
quickly solve the control problem facing a pilot during an emergency. The
class of problems of interest includes those where the failure or failures are
unanticipated, but excludes those unsolvable areas (wings falling off) where
the plane cannot be saved.
The general area of emergency control modification can be divided into
two categories: reconflgurable and restructurable control. The first cate-
gory includes failures which can be anticipated and solved in advance such as
2
engine or instrument failures. The most important failures in this class are
analyzed and pilots are trained in emergency procedures to compensate for
them. The major advances in reconflgurable controls in the near future may be
expected to occur in computer storage and automatic activation of pre-solved
emergency procedures. This involves computerizing "the book", and ensuring
that emergency procedures do not simply rely on pilot training and memory
under stress.
The second class of problems, and the one of interest here, includes
those emergencies which cannot easily be anticipated and planned for. It
includes those cases where "the book" must be thrown out. Ideally, the solu-
tion to this class of problems would place the experience and expertise of the
best pilots and aircraft control system designers immediately at the disposal
of the pilot in trouble. Such experts would analyze the problem and recommend
solutions (some, perhaps, unconventional). Their actions would return the
aircraft to a safe operating condition, and they would remain available to
answer "what if" questions for the remainder of the flight, in particular
involving changes to the aircraft to prepare for landing.
This assembly of experts would, in fact, be answering the following
questions:
i. Did a failure occur?
2. What failure(s) occurred?
3. Must I restructure the controls to accommodate the failure(s),
and if so, how?
4. What else will happen if I change the controls?
The first two questions constitute failure detection and identification,
(FDI) and have received much research interest in the last decade [4]-[14].
Automatic techniques exist for determining whether a failure has occurred and
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for isolating the failure component. Significant advances in designing robust
FDI systems which can accomplish their mission with "real world" plant uncer-
tainty and disturbances have recently been made and some early prototypes are
being tested [4]-[5].
If a new aircraft model were available from an FDI system, a reliable
automatic procedure would be required to answer the third and fourth question.
Control restructuring must take place when a failure is beyond the accommoda-
tion capabilities of the normally configured aircraft. Thus an FDI system
must provide an estimate of failure severity in order for a decision about the
need for control restructuring to take place. When required, a restructuring
of the control system then provides the desired forces and moments on the
aircraft in spite of the failure. Techniques for accomplishing this control
redesign were the topic of the first year's effort of this contract.
1.2 AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO RFCS DESIGN
The development of an integrated Restructurable Flight Control System
(RFCS) is best viewed as a problem in failure accommodation. As indicated in
Fig. I-i, failures can be accommodated either passively or actively.
Passive fault tolerance can be thought of as robustness -- the aircraft
with its normal flight control system (including the pilot) can tolerate
certain failures without modification. Other failures, however, may be too
severe for the normal (i.e., any acceptable normal) controller to handle,
and thus require active system modification. This modification involves
(implicitly or explicitly) two processes: (I) failure detection and identi-
fication (including identification of the post-failure system model) and
(2) control system reconfiguratlon in light of the identified failure.
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Figure i-i. Failure Accommodation Decomposition
A successful near-term RFCS has to possess several characterisics. These
include:
i. the ability to handle variations due to failures whose impact
ranges from negligible to nearly debilitating,
2. the ability to perform in a highly uncertain and noisy system
environment,
3. the ability to degrade gracefully with the severity of the
failures, and
4. the ability to maintain the aircraft performance during and
after reconfiguration. To accomplish these goals both
passive and active failure accommodation methods are needed.
Figure 1-2 provides a functional component description of a RFCS which
exploits both passive and active failure accommodation. This system consists
of a robust multivariable flight control system, a failure detection and iden-
tification algorithm and a procedure for automatic control system redesign.
A robust multivariable flight control system is essential to any RFCS.
This system must exploit the inherent control redundancy in the aircraft to
minimize the effects of actuator failures and other damage. Of course, it is
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Figure 1-2. RFCS Component Decomposition
unlikely that a robust control system alone would be sufficient to handle the
wide range of failure/damage modes. Such a system would require infeasibly
high loop gains and bandwidth, must unacceptably compromise the performance of
the unfailed aircraft, or would require unnecessarily complex FCS hardware to
achieve reliability. However, a properly designed robust flight control sys-
tem applied to the unfailed aircraft will be able to handle the less severe
failure/damage modes, and will lengthen the time available for reconfiguring
the FCS.
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The more severe failure/damage modes will requlre a reconfiguratlon of
the FCS. As indicated In Fig. 1-2, the reconfiguratlon is initiated by a FDI
system. The problems of false alarms and missed detections are mlnlmlzed by
combining the FDI system with a nominal robust control system. As noted,
the nominal control system is designed to handle as many as possible of the
failure/damage conditions. The FDI system is then only required to handle
failure/damages that severly impact performance. As the severity of the
impact of a failure on the aircraft performance increases, the urgency of
reaction increases and the time available to reconfigure decreases. However,
this trend is compensated by the corresponding increase in the signature of
the failure, which reduces the required time for the FDI system to respond.
This phenomenon, coupled with the effects of the robust control system and
robust FDI design techniques should allow a properly designed FDI system to
virtually eliminate the problem of false alarms and missed detection.
The last component in Fig. 1-2 consists of an automatic control system
redesign procedure and has been the primary focus of the research completed
under this project [I], [15]-[17]. The automatic redesign module (ARM) uses
the information about failures provided by the FDI system to modify the nominal
robust FCS. To be effective, the new control system must be able to recon-
struct the desired forces and moments as much as possible given the presence
of large disturbances due to failures, and constraints on the control system.
Since control system constraints were important in the design of the nominal
robust control system, the engineering tradeoffs which went into that design
should be reflected in the new control deslgn. Furthermore, the ARM should
be tolerant of FDI limitations. Incorporation of FDI uncertainty into the
redesign procedure will allow the new control system to hedge against imper-
fectly detected or isolated failures. Finally, graceful degradation of per-
formance as the severity of failure increases should be a property of the ARM
and can be obtained by ensuring that the nominal control system is recovered
by the ARM when no failures are present.
1.3 OUTLINE OF THIS REPORT
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
a precise description of the automatic control redesign problem. The problem
is decomposed into finding feedforward control values which will (ideally) trim
the aircraft and a modification of the nominal feedback control law which is
used to remove the effects of uncertainty and provide as much dynamic response
to pilot commands as is possible. Section 3 provides the details of the feed-
forward "automatic trim" problem and provides an algorithm for its solution.
Section 4 presents a redesign procedure for determining a new feedback control
law. This redesign procedure is based on the linear quadratic (LQ) regulator
problem, however, it is not necessary that LQ be used to design the nominal
control law which is used during unfailed operation. Section 5 puts these
two subsystems (automatic trim and control law redesign) together and shows
how the solutions to these problems are implemented. Section 6 applies the
techniques developed in Sections 3 through 5 to a model of a modified Boeing
737 aircraft. An LQ design methodology is used to develop a robust feedback
control law which forms the basis for the control law redesign procedure.
Solutions to the trim problem are investigated for a variety of realistic
failure modes, and a variety of linear analyses of the redesign procedure
are performed for these same failure cases. The llnear analyses include an
eigenvalue analysis and linear simulations. Section 7 describes an investi-
gation of the two subsystems using the NASA Langley Research Center's nonlin-
ear aircraft simulation. Finally, a summary and conclusions are provided in
Section 8.
SECTION 2
PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we provide a precise description of the restructurable
control problem and discuss some of the desirable features which any solution
should contain.
We assume that under normal operation, the motion of the aircraft can be
described by the nonlinear, time invariant differential equation,
x = fo(X,U) (2-1)
Y = ho(x,u) (2-2)
where x is the n-dimensional state vector and u is an m-dimensional vector
of controls (e.g., all control surfaces, engine controls, possible thrust
vectoring, etc.) and y is a vector of "important" quantities (not necessarily
measurable)• The unfailed aircraft is said to be "trimmed" when
fo(xT,UT) = 0 (2-3)
ho(XT,UT) = Yd (2-4)
for some constant values of (XT,UT) with Yd being the desired values of the
important quantities (e.g., flight path angle, forward velocity, angular
rates, etc.). Furtherfore, we will assume that a nominal control system is
employed (for stability augmentation, control augmentation, disturbance
rejection, etc.) and takes the form,
i0
u = Go x + ur (2-5)
where in general, the feedback gain, Go, may be a function of flight condition
and ur is a dynamic reference signal which is ultimately derived from the
pilot inputs, r. Note that Eq. 2-5 assumes that any feedback compensator
dynamics are embodied in Eq. 2-1.
In general, those aircraft failures which potentially result in emergency
conditions can be modeled by
x = fF(x,u) + w (2-6)
y = hF(x,u ) (2-7)
Equations 2-6 and 2-7 include changes in the aerodynamics of the aircraft,
changes in control effectiveness, and potentially large disturbances (e.g.,
due to a stuck, off-centered control surface)• The nominal control gain, Go,
is typically designed without the effect of failures in mind. However, a
large degree of fault tolerance may be achieved by proper choice of Go • If
Go distributes the control authority amongst a variety of surfaces then any
single surface failure becomes less critical in terms of reduction in command
following performance. Furthermore, the use of integral action in the com-
pensator (i.e., high loop gains at low frequencies) may allow the aircraft to
recover automatically from a failure. That is, it may be possible to achieve
fF(XF,UF) = 0 (2-8)
hF(XF,UF) = Yd (2-9)
automatically for some failures with the proper choice of Go .
Ii
Naturally, there will be some failures (or combination of failures) for
which the nominal control system is not adequate. In these cases, we want to
find a new control law of the form,
u = GF x + urF + uFT (2-10)
where GF represents a new feedback gain, urF represents a new pilot reference
signal and uF is a feedforward control that can be used to (approximately)
reject the disturbances, w. The control system redesign problem becomes,
therefore, one of choosing GF,UF, and the relationship between urF and the
pilot inputs, r. These choices are made so that the aircraft is stabilized,
disturbances can be rejected, the aircraft will follow the pilot commands and
(more importantly) so that the limitations of the aircraft are not violated.
Furthermore, these choices must take into account the fact that the aircraft
model in Eqs. 2-8 and 2-9 are uncertain since we may rely on some FDI algo-
rithm to identify this model. That is, in addition to the performance goals
and aircraft constraints, a degree of robustness which is typically greater
than would be considered for a normal aircraft must be achieved.
The automatic redesign algorithms developed for this project were devel-
oped within this framework and address all of the issues discussed above. The
nominal feedback control law is designed using an LQ design procedure which
will distribute the control authority amongst all available surfaces. As a
result, a large degree of fault tolerance is achievable with no reconfigura-
tlon. The feedback control redesign procedure uses the design parameters
(state and control weighting matrices) of the nominal control law as a basis
for any redesign. In this way, performance can be optimized while maintaining
the bandwidth constraints that are embodied in the nominal design. Finally,
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an automatic feedforward trim algorithm Is developed so that any large dis-
turbances due to a failure can be quickly accommodated.
In the remainder of this report, we will review the control redesign
algorithm developed for this project and demonstrate the performance and
robustness capabilities of a nominal LQ control design and the new control
system produced by the redesign procedure for a variety of failure modes.
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SECTION 3
THE AUTOMATIC TRIM PROBLEM
The solution of the automatic trim problem is one of the most time-critical
components of the restructurable control system. This is because substantial
deviations from the desired trim condition (following a failure) is likely
to result in a situation where the remaining control authority available for
recovery is insufficient• In this section, we present a formal description of
the automatic trim problem and describe a decomposition of that problem which
allows us to use fast and efficient algorithms in the solution procedure.
3.1 THE NONLINEAR TRIM PROBLEM
During normal flight, the motion of an aircraft with respect to some
inertial reference frame can, in general, be described by the nonlinear time-
invarient differential equations
x = fo(X,U) +
(3-1)
y = ho(x,u )
where x is an n-dimensional state vector, u is an m-dimensional control vector,
is a vector of (presumably unmeasurable) disturbances, and y is an output
vector of important quantities. The aircraft is trimmed at the nominal values
(Xn,Un) when
fo(Xn,Un) = 0
(3-2)
ho(xn,Un) = 0
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For example, during straight and level flight, nominal control settings,
Un, are established which maintain steady state flight (x = O) at constant
altitude (flight path angle, y = 8 -c = O) at some desired airspeed and
heading and level wings.
Following a failure, the aircraft dynamics are assumed to satisfy
x = f(x,u) + _ + w
(3-3)
y = h(x,u)
where w is a constant (or slowly varying) measurable disturbance vector. For
example, in the case of a stuck actuator, w represents the force and moment
disturbance that results from the constant nonzero deflection. Following a
failure, then, a trim condition results when
f(Xn,Un) + w = 0
(3-4)
h(xn,Un) = 0
The primary goal of an automatic trim function is to find a solution
(Xn,Un) which satifies Eq 3-4. We can then apply the control un to the air-
craft directly (assuming no control system; linear combinations of Xn and Un
are applied when feedback is employed) and achieve a fast initial recovery.
This result, of course, can only be achieved if the solution (Xn,Un) is
a feasible one. That is, certain constraints on the allowable values of xn
and un must be imposed• For example, restrictions on un would include the
travel limits on the control surfaces and the power limits on the engine
inputs. Restrictions on xn represent the region of validity of the aircraft
model in Eq. 3-3 and would include minimum airspeeds (e.g., above stall),
angle of attack limits, and altitude restrictions•
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Finally, in order to create a formal well-posed problem statement we note
that two cases of special interest exist. In the first case, several solutions
to Eq. 3-4 exist within the feasible region. In this case, we will choose a
solution which minlmizes the norm (e.g., in a weighted least squares sense) of
the difference between the vector (Xn,Un) and some "desired" vector (xnO,unO).
This allows us to ensure that maximal 'residual' control authority remains
available for disturbance rejection and command following. The second case
arises when no solution to Eq. 3-4 exists within the feasible region. In this
case we will choose the solution which minimizes the norm (again, e.g., in a
weighted least squares sense) of the left hand side of Eq. 3-4.
Maklng the following definitions, we can now formally state the nonlinear
trim problem. Let
z = (X n - xnO , u n - unO )
F = {z : xn and un are feasible solutions}
D = _z : z = arg min(llf(z) + wll + IIh(z)U)} .
The solution to the nonlinear trim problem, z*, is then given by:
z* = arg min llzll
Subject to (3-5)
z_F, z_D
That is, we want to choose a feasible z which satisfies Eq. 3-4 as nearly as
possible, and if more than one such solution exists, to choose the one of
least norm.
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As discussed in [I], while the above problem statement accurately repre-
sents the goals of an automatic trim system, solution methods may be compli-
cated by the various nonlinear functions which are used to describe the
system. Furthermore, these complexities may not be truly representative of
the complexities which must be faced in establishing an adequate trim solu-
tion. For example, for small enough perturbations about some nominal value of
z, Eq. 3-4 can be well approximated by a set of linear equations. As we will
discuss subsequently, fast and efficient solution procedures can be utilized
to solve Eq. 3-5 when Eq. 3-4 is linear.
Making use of linear approximations, we can decompose the nonlinear trim
problem into two subproblems which are solved (and possibly iterated upon) in
order to determine a complete solution. The first subproblem is the operating
point selection problem. The primary purpose here is to determine nominal
values of the states (xn) and control variables (un) which results in a
trimmed unfailed aircraft. A llnearized version of the aircraft dynamics
about this nominal can then be determined and, the constraints, objectives
and/or priorities for the second subproblem, the linear trim problem, estab-
lished. The linear trim problem then solves for feasible perturbations from
the nominal values which adequately reject the failure induced disturbances.
The determination of a suitable operating point is a function of a number
of factors and is based on the desired flight objective. For example, during
a landing approach, it may be sufficient to select a single operating point
which corresponds to level wings and some nominal flight path angle. If
another flight path is desired, the pilot controls deviations from this
nominal to achieve the desired result. A linearized model for this operating
point can then be identified along with an estimate of the model's "region of
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validity." This region is then translated into constraints on the state and
control perturbations for the linear trim problem. After examlnatlon of the
solution to the linear trim problem, the operating point selection problem may
take advantage of parts of the nonlinear problem in order to find a combina-
tion of flight objective and linearized model for which an acceptable linear
trim solution can be found. Included in this part of the operating point
selection problem are such (nonlinear) factors as the use of "discrete" con-
trol elements which primarily influence the linear model (e.g., fuel dumping
and c.g. changes), the nonlinear effect of velocity and altitude changes and
possible changes to the flight objective.
3.2 THE LINEAR TRIM PROBLEM
For the linear trim problem, we assume that a linearized model of the
aircraft about some nominal states and controls can be given by:
Xp(t) = Axp(t) + Bup(t) + Wp (3-6)
where Xp(t) is the perturbation of the state vector (Xp = x - Xo, Up(t) is
the vector of available control perturbations (Up = u - Uo) and Wp is a vector
of constant disturbances. The vector Wp can be used to represent forces and
moments generated by failed surfaces.
The key quantities that are to be regulated can in general be denoted by:
yp = Cxp (3-7)
Elements of y might represent quantities such as altitude, bank angle, flight
path angle, and rotational rate perturbations. The primary objective of the
linear disturbance rejection problem is to automatically select Xp and Up such
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that y achieves some desired value in steady state. More precisely, the
linear trim objective can be expressed as
Yp = Yd (3-8)
and
0 = Axp + BUp + Wp (3-9)
As in the nonlinear trim problem, we will want to impose some constraints
on the allowable perturbations (x,u) for which a solution will be sought. In
the linear trim case, these restrictions must be more conservative in order to
insure that the resulting trim solution remains within the region of validity
of the linear model. In most cases, these constraints can be described as
upper and lower limits on the allowable perturbations, viz.,
xL _ Xp < xU
(3-10)
uL < Up < uU
Equations 3-8 through 3-10 describe the objectives of the linear trim
problem. Like the nonlinear trim problem, in order to form a well-posed
optimization problem we must examine two special cases. When several solu-
tions to Eqs. 3-8 through 3-10 exist, we will call the problem feasible and
choose (Xp,Up) to minimize the norm of the difference between (Xp,Up) and some
desired value (xpO,upO). In particular, we have:
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Feasible Problem
Minimize Jl = nXp - xpOn + qUp - upOg
Subject to 0 = Axp + Bup + Wp
Yd = Cxp (3-11)
xL • Xp • xU
uL • Up • uU
Various norms and weighting matrices can be used in Eq. 3-11 as discussed
in [18]. These choices can be made off-line based on the physical character-
istics of the aircraft and its control surfaces. It should also be noted that
Eq. 3-11 must be solved on-line after the disturbance w has been measured or
estimated. However, in the least squares case, Eq. 3-11 is a standard quad-
ratic programming problem for which a number of fast, efficient solution algo-
rithms have been developed.
If a solution to Eqs. 3-8 through 3-10 exists, it guarantees that the
principal objectives can be satisfied. That is, the important quantities can
be zeroed (Eq. 3-8), steady state flight is possible (Eq. 3-9), and no pre-
specified state or control constraints have been violated (Eq. 3-10). It is
possible, however, that Eqs. 3-8 through 3-10 overspecify the problem. In
this case, it is impossible to achieve the objectives of the linear trim prob-
lem at the chosen flight condition. However, a variation of Eq. 3-11 can be
used to gain time to choose a new nominal flight condition or to achieve
slowly degrading flight. The key is to try to minimize the size of both the
important quantities, yp, and the state perturbation derivatives:
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Infeasible Problem
Minimize J2 = lIAxp+ Bup + wpll + nCxp - yd H
(3-12)
Subject to xL _ Xp < xU
uL _ Up _ uU
The objective in Eq. 3-12 attempts to keep the size of the state deriva-
tive and key quantities small. Again, various norms and weighting matrices
can be used. A solution to Eq. 3-12 will always exist. As with Eq. 3-11, a
least squares formulation of Eq. 3-12 leads to a quadratic programming problem
and can easily be solved on-line using fast and efficient algorithms.
As in the nonlinear trim problem, the two problems described above
(feasible and infeasible) can be compactly described as follows. Let,
z = (Xp - Xpo, Up - Up°)
F = {z : zL < z < zU}
D = {z : (Xp,Up) = arg min J2} •
The solution to the linear trim problem is given by,
z* = arg min Jl
Subject to (3-13)
z_F, zcD
That is, we start by solving the infeasible problem (Eq. 3-12) and determining
the optimal objective function, J2*. If, in fact, the feasible problem has
a solution, then J2* = O, and in general, more than one solution may exist.
The second stage is to minimize the objective Jl (Eq. 3-11) subject to the
constraints of Eq. 3-10 and the constraint J2 = J2*"
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This completes our discussion of the automatic trim problem and the
decomposition of that problem into an operating point selection problem, and
a linear trim problem. The linear trim problem provides a formulation which
allows fast and efficient quadratic programming algorithms to be used when the
norms are interpreted in the least squares sense. In the next section, we
will describe a quadratic programming algorithm which takes special advantage
of the structure of the problem (Eq. 3-13) and the constraint set, F.
3.3 A QUADRATIC PROGRAMMING ALGORITHM
In this subsection we describe a quadratic programming algorithm which
takes advantage of the special structure of the problem described in the pre-
vious section. The simplicity of the constraint set and the special nature
of minimum norm quadratic programming problems will allow us to use fast and
efficient methods in computing the necessary quantities for the algorithm's
operation.
As discussed in the previous section, the problem which we are attempting
to solve is a least squares problem which can in general be represented by
Minimize (Jl = zT z)
Subject to zL < z < zU (3-14)
z_ z : z = arg min J2 = -- (Fz - d)T(Fz - d)
2
where the solution variables, z, are in Rn, F is an m×n matrix and d is in Rm.
That is, of all the solutions, z, which minimize J2, we want the feasible one
of the least norm.
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3.3.1 Solution Procedure: Overview
The most common solution procedure for any quadratic programming problem
is the active set method [19]. This method is an iteratlve procedure in which,
at each stage in the algorithm, the current iterate satisfies the inequality
constraints in Eq. 3-14.
The first step in the active set solution procedure is the selection of
any feasible solution to the inequality constraints in (Eq. 3-14) (e.g., z=0
when zL < 0 and zU > O)_and the determination of which of these constraints
are active (i.e., satisfied with equality).
Next, a step direction is obtained which minimizes J2 in the subspace of
active constraints. For the problem at hand, this minimization is obtained
by simply removing the elements of z which are active (constrained) from
consideration, partitioning F into active and inactive columns, adding the
effect of the constrained elements to the value of d in Eq. 3-14, and finally,
finding the remaining elements of z by using a singular value decomposition
of the inactive part of F. Details of this procedure will be provided in the
next subsection. Note here, however, that the singular value decomposition
of a matrix provides a basis for its' range and null spaces and as such, will
be used to find the minimum norm (of the remaining elements of z) solution if
the reduced problem is under-constrained.
The next step in the procedure is to check if the solution to the con-
strained optimum problem found above is feasible. If any of the inequality
constraints are violated, then the step direction (defined by the current
feasible solution and the solution to the constrained optimization problem
found above) is scaled so that the next iterate is also feasible. That is,
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if a step in the direction of the constrained optimum runs into a currently
inactive constraint, then that constraint is added to the set of active con-
straints and the process above is repeated.
If, at this point in the solution procedure, the number of constraints
equals the number of elements in z, then the current iterate is at a vertex
of the constraint region. In this case we then check a set of stopping
criteria to see if a single active constraint can be removed. If this is
possible, a constraint is removed and the above process is continued. If the
step direction does not need to be scaled (i.e., no inactive constraints will
be violated), then the stopping criteria are also checked and the algorithm
continued if an active constraint can be removed. The algorithm terminates
when the stopping criteria indicate that no active constraints can be removed.
Stopping Criteria
In order to determine if the current iterate is the solution which is
sought, the algorithm must check if any of the currently active constraints
can be removed. If no constraints are active or if no constraints can be
removed, then the current iterate solves Eq. 3-14. Furthermore, if several
constraints can be removed, we must choose one of these for the algorithm to
be continued. (This is to avoid so called cycling problems such as those
discussed in [19]).
The method by which the above is accomplished is by the use of Lagrange
multipliers [20]. In the solution to any constrained optimization problem, it
is possible to compute or estimate such multipliers. The reason these quan-
tities are useful is that they represent the price associated with the active
constraints. That is, each multiplier indicates the sensitivity of the cost
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function which is being optimized to a feasible perturbation of the current
iterate in a subspace which corresponds to the remaining constraints. Thus,
for example, if all multipliers indicate that the cost function would increase
(for a minimization problem) then we may conclude that the current iterate is
optimal. (Note, this is just a statement of the Kuhn/Tucker conditions given
in [19],[20]).
For Eq. 3-14, there are two cost functions (Jl and J2) for which we
desire Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the current set of active con-
straints. In the procedure to be detailed in the next subsection, we first
compute multipliers which correspond to the sensitivity of J2 (Eq. 3-14) to
the current active constraints. If these multipliers indicate that a set of
constraints can be removed, we choose the constraint which reduces the cost
the most (i.e., largest multiplier, in magnitude). If these multipliers indi-
cate that no constraint can be removed to reduce J2, then we compute multi-
pliers which correspond to the sensitivity of Jl to the active constraints
with the further restriction that the feasible perturbations lie in the sub-
space defined by J2 = J2* (where J2* = current value of J2)" As detailed in
the next subsection, the latter computation is easily accomplished by comput-
ing the singular value decomposition of the matrix F (in Eq. 3-14) augmented
with appropriate selection matrices corresponding to the above constraints.
The constraints associated with the largest cost reduction is chosen at this
point. The stopping criteria are satisfied when, at this stage, no constraint
can be removed.
The algorithm descrlbed above is summarized as follows.
I. Determine an initial feasible point, zk(k=O), which satisfies
the inequality constraints.
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2. Compute the optimum z (say _), along the current set of
active constraints.
3. Compute the new step direction P = Ks(_-Zk) where = is chosen
so that Zk+ I = zk + P is feasible.
4. If Ks = i or if Zk+ I is a vertex go to 6.
5. Else: k = k+l, go to 2.
6. Compute Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the active
constraints for the problem of minimizing J2"
7. If any constraints can be removed_ remove the one which
reduces J2 the most. Update k = k+l. Go to 2.
8. If no constraint can be removed, compute the Lagrange
multipliers corresponding to the active constraints for
the problem of minimizing Jl subject to J2 = J2"-
9. If any constraint can now be removed, choose the one which
reduces Jl the most. Update k = k+l. Go to 2.
I0. Else: Done.
3.3.2 Solution Procedure Details
In this subsection we provide some of the details of the algorithm
described above. The description here follows the steps outlined in the
above summary description.
Step I: Initial Feasible Point
For most purposes, an initial value of z = 0 will satisfy the inequality
constraints. If this is not the case, an initial feasible solution can be
easily chosen as any combination of upper and lower bounds ZLi , zul (the nota-
tion zi will be used to denote the i'th element of z).
Step 2: Solve Constrained Minimization Problem
The upper and lower bounds on the value of any zi cannot both be active
at the same time. If we keep track of these constraints separately, somewhat
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simpler computations can be achieved over those needed in the application of
a standard quadratic programming algorithm to this problem. To keep track of
these constraints, we define two index sets based on the current value of z;
IL = {l:zI = zLl }
(3-15)
Iu = {i:zi = zui }
We now define a matrix Fc,
Fc = [FL FU ] (3-16)
where FL consists of the columns of the matrix F for all iclL and FU consists
of the columns of the matrix F for all i£IU. Also, let
bT-- [bLT , buT ] (3-17)
where bL and bU are elements of the bounds on z (zL and zU respectively) cor-
responding to all i € IL and all i £ IU respectively.
In the subspace corresponding to the active constraints (indicated by
Eq. 3-15) the objective function J2 (see Eq. 3-14) can be written as
_2 : (F-zf - d)T([zf - d-) (3-18)
where
F = the columns of F corresponding to all inactive constraints,
(i.e., the ith column of F appears in F if i _ (IL U Iu) c _ If,
where c denotes complement),
zf = elements of z which are not constrained,
d = d-Fc b •
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Thus, the solution to the constrained minimization problem (i.e., minimize J2
subject to the active constraints remaining active) can be found by solving
the unconstrained problem: mlnimize _ 2. Since this is just a standard least
squares problem, the solution is formally given by
zf = F--?id (3-19)
where _# represents the Penrose pseudo inverse of F. Note that in the compu-
tation of zf by Eq. 3-19, if the problem of minimizing J_ is under-constralned,
then zf is the solution of minimum norm in the least squares sense (e.g.,
see [34]).
The most reliable way to compute zf is through the singular value decom-
position (SVD) of the matrix _. (Many of the issues associated with this
problem are also addressed in [34].) If _ is an m x n matrix of numerical
rank r, then its SVD takes the form
F = Ul U2 SI 0 vIT
0 E v2T (3-20)
= U g VT
where
UI is an m x r matrix of left singular vectors,
U2 is an m x m-r matrix of left singular vectors,
SI is an r x r diagonal matrix of singular values each of which
is greater than some prespeclfled tolerance,
E is an m-r x n-r diagonal 'error' matrix,
VI is an n x r matrix of right singular vectors,
V2 is an n x n-r matrix of right singular vectors.
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Furthermore, U and V are orthonormal matrices (i.e., uTu = vTv = I). From
these properties, one can show that V2 is a basis for the null space of F and
U 1 is a basis for its range space. The solution, zf, to the unconstrained
problem of minimizing J2 can then be computed by
zf = (VI) (Sl)-I(uI)T _ (3-21)
Step 3: Compute the New Step Direction
The new step direction, P, is defined by the equation
p = Ks(_ - Zk) (3-22)
where zk is the current iterate,
_i = zLi for all i € I L
_i = zui for all i € IU
_If(j) = zfJ, where If(j) denotes the j-th element of If _ (ILU IU)C
and where Ks is computed as follows. Let
ZLi - Zki
KL = min 1 , , for all i: i _ If , _i _ zki _ 0 (3-23)
_ z i
Zui - zki
Ku = min 1 , -- -- , for all i: i € If , £i _ zki ) 0 (3-24)
_
then Ks is defined by
Ks = min {KL , KU , i} (3-25)
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If Ks = I, then no constraints need to be added. Otherwise, the index set
IL (or IU) is updated to include the index, i, which achieves the minimum in
Eq. 3-23 (or 3-24).
Step 6: Compute the First set of Lagrange Multipliers
The f_rst set of multipliers correspond to the problem of minimizing J2
subject to i E (ILU IU). These multipliers can be computed by forming the
so-called Hamiltonian function [20],
H = J2 - I ILJ(zk j - ZL j) - [ Iui[zk i - zui) (3-26)j i
and setting the partial derivative of H with respect to z equal to zero (i.e.,
solving one of the necessary conditions of optimality as given in [20]). Since
the sets IL and IU are mutually exclusive, it can be shown that the desired
multipliers are given by
liT = [ILT , IuT ]
(3-27)
= FT(Fzk - d)
Step 7: Test Multipliers and Update Constraints
Equations 3-26 and 3-27 indicate that the current solution is globally
optimal if %L i _ 0 for all i and if %Uj • 0 for all j. This can be seen as
Zki ZL i " .follows. At the current Zk, = and ZkS = zu J for i _ IL and j _ IU.
Therefore, H(Zk) = J2(Zk). But, zk was obtained by minimizing H, so for any
_ _ IUiother Zk, say z, H(zk) • H(_). If z is feasible and if ILi ) 0 and • O,
then, referring to Eq. 3-26, H(_) • J2(_). From these arguments, we have
J2(zk) • J2(_) for any feasible z; which is equivalent to stating that zk is
globally optimal.
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If any of the Lagrange multipliers violate the conditions stated at the
top of the previous paragraph, then the current iterate, Zk, is not optimal
and one of the constraints can be removed. If several of the multipliers
violate the above conditions, the index, i, corresponding to the largest (in
absolute value) of these multipliers is chosen as the index of the constraint
to be removed.
Step 8: Compute the Second Set of Multipliers
The second set of multipliers corresponds to the problem of minimizing
Jl subject to i _(ILU IU) and J2 remaining unchanged. That is, the problem
Min _zk + AzN 2
Subject to (zk + Az) g F
FAz = 0
has the solution Az = O, along the currently active constraints (this is how
zk was determined in step 6) and Lagrange multipliers given by
_2T = (A2T)# zk (3-28)
where
AT = IFr SET SuT ]
SL(i,j ) = i if IL(i) = j ; otherwise St(i,j ) = 0
Su(i,j ) = i if Iu(i) = j ; otherwise Su(i,j ) = 0
2T = [%FT , %2LT , %2U T]
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Step 9: Test Multipliers and Update Constraints
As in Step 7, the condition of global optimality is _Li ) O, _Ui _ O. If
any of these conditions are violated, we remove the constraint corresponding
to the largest (in magnitude) %2i of those which do not satisfy the optimality
conditions.
At this stage, if no constraint can be removed, (i.e., the optimality
conditions are satisfied) then the algorithm terminates with the current
iterate as the solution.
3.3.3 Scaling
Convergence of the quadratic programming algorithm described in subsec-
tions 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 is greatly dependent on the relative sizes of the ele-
ments in F and d in Eq. 3-14. In Section 6.3, the effect of scaling on speed
of convergence is demonstrated for the B-737 application. In general, we can
transform Eq. 3-14 as follows. Let,
zs = Sz-I z
(3-29)
ds = Sd-i d
where Sz and Sd are diagonal weightingmatrices. If the i-th diagonal element
of Sz is large, then the i-th element of z will tend to have larger values in
the feasible problem. If the i-th diagonal of Sd is large, then the error in
the i-th disturbancedirectionwill be larger. Problem (Eq. 3-14) then
becomes
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Min J1 = zsT Zs
Subject to Sz-I zL < zs < Sz-I zU
z € {z : z = arg mln J2 TM IFs ° Zs - Sd " ds!
where
Fs = F Sz (3-30)
3.4 LINEAR TRIM WITH UNCERTAINTY
Until now, our discussions of the linear trim problem have focused on
solutions for the case where both the disturbance w (see Eq. 3-3) and the
control effectiveness matrix, B, were known exactly. As in the development
of control redesign procedures ([I]), it is desirable to formulate a problem
in which specific knowledge about relative uncertainty can be used. That is,
for example, we would llke to incorporate into the quadratic programming algo-
rithm, the capacity for trading off the use of control surfaces which may have
a large nominal, but uncertain effect for those which may have more certain
but small nominal effects. Furthermore, we would llke the algorithm to be
able to distinguish between those disturbances which are well known and those
which are uncertain so that excessive control authority is not lost in trying
to compensate for a poorly modeled or estimated disturbance.
We can accomplish these goals by formulating the trim problem with uncer-
tainty in a similar vein to the development of control system redesign proce-
dures [i]. Suppose, in Eq. 3-14, the matrix F and disturbance d are random
variables with
F = Fn + AF
E{AF} = 0 (3-31)
E{AF T AF} = QF
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d = dn + Ad
E{Ad) = 0 (3-32)
Z{Ad T Ad} = Rd
where E(o) denotes expected value.
Using Eqs. 3-31 and 3-32, the objective function J2 (Eq. 3-1) can then be
expanded as,
J2 = (Fz - d)T(Fz - d)
= zT FnT Fn z + 2 z FnT AF z + zT AFT AF z
(3-33)
- 2 dnT Fn z - 2 dnT AF z - 2 AdT Fn z - 2 AdT AF z
+ dnTd n + 2 dnT Ad + AdTAd
Since AF and Ad are random variables, J2 is now a random variable. In order
to provide a deterministic quantity which can be optimized in the linear trim
problem, we must consider some kind of statistical average of J2" Two such
averages are the average cost E(J2} , and the mean square cost, E{J22}. The
average cost case is considered below.
Minimum Average Cost
Combining Eqs. 3-31 through 3-33, and assuming that Ad and AF are uncor-
related, the expected value of J2 is_
E(J 2) = zT(Fn T Fn + QF)Z - 2 dnT Fn z + dnT dn + Rd (3-34)
Equation 3-34 can then be put into standard form (Eq. 3-14) by completing the
square resulting in,
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Z{J2} = (fz - _)Z(fz - _) + g (3-35)
where
_T _ = Fn T Fn + QF (3-36)
_T _ = FnT dn (3-37)
_z_ + g = dnZdn+ Rd (3-38)
The effect of including uncertainty Information In the description of the
linear trim problem and minimizing the average cost can be seen by examination
of Eq. 3-34. The uncertainty in d results In a constant positive value (R)
added to the cost, but does not change the optimal solution, z*, which minl-
mizes E(J2}. The uncertainty in F results In the addition of the term zT Q z
to the cost. This term amounts to an additional weighting or scaling of the
solution variables, z, that reflects the relative amount of uncertainty con-
tributed by each element of z. Elements of z with large uncertainty contrib-
ute more to the expected cost than do elements with small values so that the
solution, z*, will realize a tradeoff between the use of elements which have
different nominal effectivenesses and different amounts of uncertainty associ-
ated wlth their disturbance rejection capabilities. Note that uncertainty in
the A, B, and C matrices in Eqs. 3-6 and 3-7 can be incorporated into this
formulation.
The average cost function described above provides a problem formulation
that results in an automatic tradeoff between solution elements of various
effectiveness and uncertainty. However, the uncertainty in the disturbance to
be rejected does not affect the solution. Examining Eq. 3-33, we can see that
while, on average, Ad only creates an increase in J2 which is unrelated to
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the choice of z (Ad TAd term), the actual value of Ad does create a z-dependent
effect on the actual cost function. Thus, one would expect that the z-dependent
impact of Ad on the cost occurs primarily in higher order moments of the cost
function (e.g., E{(J2)2} ). Minimization of the mean square cost is then a
likely candidate objective function. The resulting solution to the mlnlmlza-
tlon of such an objective would provide the desired tradeoff between the use
of solution elements to cancel disturbances of uncertain effect. Disturbance
directions, which are not well known, result in large mean square values of
J2 when certain elements of z in the solution are large. The algorithm would
then balance this uncertainty with its ability to achieve the desired nominal
disturbance rejection capability. Unfortunately, the computation of E{J22 }
involves fourth-order moments of AF and Ad which would need to be specified
(or derived from a Gaussian error assumption). Furthermore, the resulting
objective cannot necessarily be factored in a form which results in a qua-
dratic programming algorithm. Therefore, the minimum average cost provides
the easiest method for incorporating knowledge about the uncertainty in F into
the linear trim problem.
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SECTION 4
AN LQ-BASED CONTROL LAW REDESIGN PROCEDURE
4.1 PRELIMINARIES
The purpose of this section is to formulate and solve an optlmizatlon
problem that forms the basis for the automatic redesign procedure. The pri-
mary criteria for the automatic redesign optimization problem will be to maxi-
mlze the performance of the feedback system, in a specific sense, subject to
constraints on the system bandwidth. The automatic redesign system will be
based on Linear Quadratic design techniques [23]-[25]. The Kalman Equality
[26] is used to determine the benefits that result from a LQ design and to
formulate an approximation to the bandwidth constraints of the control system.
A performance measure then is formulated to approximate these benefits.
We will assume that the system is described in state variable form by:
x(t) = Aox(t) + Bou(t ) (4-1)
where x(t) is an n-dimensional vector consisting of both the aircraft and
control system compensation states, and u(t) is an m-dimensional vector of
aircraft control effectors. It will also be assumed that the aircraft control
system has been designed using LQ design techniques, and hence that the con-
trol u(t) minimizes
J = f [xT CoT CoX + uT Rou]dt • (4-2)
0
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Hence, the control u(t) is given by
u(t) - -Ro-i BoT K x(t) _-GoX(t ) (4-3)
where K solves:
AoT K + KAo + CoT Co - KB o Ro-I BoT K = 0 . (4-4)
For any state weighting matrix Co and any input weighting matrix Ro,
the return difference D of the LQ feedback system with the loop broken at the
input to the plant satisfies the Kalman Equality [26]:
D(-s)T RoD(s) = Ro + Lo(-s)T Lo(s) (4-5)
where
D(s) = I + Go(sl - Ao) -I Bo (4-6)
to(s) = Co(sl - Ao)-I Bo • (4-7)
Many performance issues are most readily discussed in terms of sensi-
tivity function (i.e., the inverse of the return difference) of the closed
loop system evaluated at the plant input:
S(s) = D(s) -I (4-8)
The relationship of S to feedback system performance has been discussed exten-
sively in the literature (c.f. [24]-[31]). In general, one obtains benefits
from feedback at those frequencies for which
US(j_)IJ < i (4-9)
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The benefits include improved response due to dynamic input disturbances and
a reduction of the effects of parameter variation. The frequency range over
which Eq. 4-9 can be achieved is generally limited by the dynamic uncertainty
of the plant, sensors, and actuators. As a result of these uncertainties, the
loop transfer function
L(s) = Go(sl - Ao)-i Bo (4-10)
must be rolled off before the uncertainties become significant.
The bandwidth limitations on the loop transfer function L(s) (Eq. 4-10)
can be imposed by unmodeled plant, sensor, or actuator dynamics. We will
assume that these constraints can be expressed in terms of a constraint on
the norm of the loop transfer function at the input of the closed loop plant
of the following form:
_PL(j_c) U < I . (4-11)
In condition 4-11, wc represents a frequency (typically the loop cross-
over frequency) at which bandwidth constraints are to be modeled. Since the
loops of a multivariable system can have different bandwidths, the weighting
matrix P is used to model the relative maximum size that the control loops
may have at a frequency chosen to model the constraints. In effect, the
matrix P can be regarded as scaling the input matrix for redesign synthesis
and analysis purposes. The ability of this constraint model to accurately
represent effects of the true physical uncertainties (such as actuator rate
limits and aeroelastlc phenomena) relles on the ablllty to represent all these
effects at a single frequency. In a general design setting, such a represen-
tation is usually not possible. However, by assuming that the original design
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for the unfailed aircraft satisfied all such constraints and by retaining any
augmented dynamics (such as notch filters or dynamics that add additional
rolloff in the loop shapes), the constraint model (Eq. 4-11) becomes useful.
Thus, the higher frequency loop shapes of the original design will be quali-
tatively retained and the constraint model (Eq. 4-11) will force the quantita-
tive constraints. This use of the constraint model (Eq. 4-11) will be adopted
by the automatic redesign procedure developed in subsection 4.2.
The constraint 4-11 uses the control loop gain G explicitly. Since the
gain G is related to the LQ design parameters C and R in a complex, nonlinear
manner, it is desirable to approximate Eq. 4-11 with a constraint that employs
C and R explicitly. Fortunately, a simple approximation to Eq. 4-11 can be
obtained from the Kalman Equality (Eq. 4-5).
The attempt to ensure that the loop transfer function is small (i.e.,
condition 4-11 can be roughly approximated by trying to keep the return dif-
ference small (i.e., near unity). The latter can be accomplished by con-
trolling the size of the right-hand side of Eq. 4-5. Let N denote the square
root of Ro-l:
Ro-i = No NoT
or (4-12)
Ro = No-T No-i
After premultiplylng Eq. 4-5 by NoT and postmultiplying by No, Eq. 4-5
becomes:
[No-i D(-s) No]T[No -I D(s) No] = I + Lc(-S) T Lc(s ) (4-13)
where
Lc(s) = Co(sl - Ao)-i BoNo • (4-14)
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Thus, we can approximately impose Eq. 4-11 by using the transfer function
Lc(s ) in Eq. 4-11 rather the true transfer function L(s). That isj we can
replace Eq. 4-11 by:
IeCo(Jwcl - Ao)-I BoNo! • I . (4-15)
Thus, Eq. 4-15 approximately represents the bandwidth llmlatlons and is
expressed only in terms of open loop and design quanlties.
4.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUTOMATIC DESIGN PROCEDURE
Given a failure of one or more aircraft control surfaces, the objective
of the linear restructurable control system is to redesign the linear control
law in a manner that preserves as much of the aircraft safety and performance
as possible. Clearly, the primary objective is to stabilize the aircraft.
Assuming that this is possible for the given flight condition and available
actuator power and bandwidth, the secondary but still important objective of
maintaining aircraft performance can then be considered. This objective can
be translated into the control system objective of maximizing the amount of
beneficial feedback in order to both maximize robustness due to uncertain
system parameters and to minimize disturbance effects.
The preceding considerations form the basis for the linear restructuring
algorithm developed in this section. The automatic redesign procedure will
use LQ regulator designs for the restructured FCS. Thus the design parameters
to be chosen by the automatic redesign procedure are the quadratic penalty
matrices C and R.
We will assume that a nominal LQ design for the unfalled aircraft is
available. The design can be characterized by the quadratic weights Co and
Ro that were used to develop the nominal design. The automatic redesign
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procedure exploits the engineering trade-offs that were made in the choice of
Co and Ro for the unfailed aircraft by fixing the new state weights,
¢N = Co (4-16)
and choosing new control weights, RN. The choice of CN, as in Eq. 4-16, en-
sures that the relative importance of each state (or combination of states)
is maintained in the Linear Quadratic regulator problem for the failed air-
craft design, thereby incorporating the physical engineering trade-offs from
the unfailed FCS design In the restructured design.
The remaining design parameter that must be specified by the automatic
redesign procedure is the input penalty matrix R. The formal objective of the
automatic design procedures will be to choose R to maximize performance in an
appropriate sense while satisfying the bandwidth constraints (Eq. 4-15).
Following a failure, we will assume that the automatic redesign module
is supplied with estimates of the state and control matrices, Af and Bf of the
failed aircraft. To simplify the presentation, we will assume that Af = Ao.
The estimated control effectiveness matrix Bf will differ from the true con-
trol effectiveness matrix Bf of the failed aircraft by an amount AB:
Bf = Bf + AB (4-17)
where AB represents the uncertainty in the effectiveness. We will assume that
the uncertainty has zero mean:
E{AB} -- 0 (4-18)
and that the covarlance between the (i,j)th element and the (k,£)th element is:
E{_BIj ABk£} = 81jk_ • (4-19)
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It should be emphasized that thls error model for the uncertainty of the con-
trol effectiveness coefficient Is for the estimates of the failed aircraft
coefficients. Since it Is assumed that the nominal values are supplied by the
FDI algorithm, it is reasonable to assume that these estimates are unbiased.
The post-fallure control system performance Is a function of the new gain
G (which we wish to select) and is determined by the "size" of the return
difference:
D--(s)= I + G(sl - Ao)-I Bf (4-20)
Since Bf is random, so is _(s). In order to ensure that D is large when
control effectivenessuncertaintyexists, we wish to choose G so that both the
&
expected size of D is large and the expected size of the uncertaintyabout D
Is small. Thls can be done as follows. Define D(s) = N-I _(s) N, where N is
the square root of the new control weightingmatrix RN. The cost functional,
which we wish to minimize, is:
The cost J will be large when the expected size of D is large and the expected
size of the uncertainty is small. Using the Kalman Equality we can rewrite
J as,
J = Ul + NT Bf(-sl - Ao)-T CoTCo(Sl - Ao)-IBf N
(4-21)
- Nr E{ABT(-sl - Ao) -T GT RN G(sl - Ao) -I AB}N_ •
Equation 4-21 wlll be used as the measure of performance that is to be
maximized by the choice of RN (i.e., N) and, hence, G. We now define the
norm in Eq. 4-21 as the trace of the integral of the frequency terms,
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J ffiTr{NT[Wco - Wu]N} (4-22)
where
Woo - BfT Wo Bf (4-23)
Wu = E{AB T W_ AB} (4-24)
co
Wo = f (-j_l - Ao)-T CoT Co(J_ I - Ao)-I d_ (4-25)0
Wo ffif_(-j_l - Ao)-T GT RN G(J_l - Ao)-I d_ . (4-26)0
Formulas 4-23 and 4-26 can be simplified. First, by using the approximation
GT RG = CoT Co (4-27)
Eqs. 4-25 and 4-26 become identical. By Parseval's theorem, if Ao has all
its eigenvalues in the left half plane, Wo is the solution to the Lyapunov
equation:
AoT Wo + WoT Ao + CoT Co = 0 . (4-28)
If Ao has one or more eigenvalues in the right half plane, a stable factoriza-
tlon of Eq. 4-25 can be used to compute Wo from an analogous Lypunov equation.
Assume that the system matrix has the spectral decomposition:
A° = [Ws Wu] I n (4-29)
u
where As is a diagonal matrix with its diagonal elements being the left half
plane eigenvalues of Ao, and Au is a diagonal matrix with its diagonal ele-
ments being the right half plane eigenvalues of Ao. Define
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rvsH7A-[wsWuJ (4-S0)
Then Wo is the solution of the Lyapunov equation (Eq. 4-28) with A replacing
Ao. For computationalpurposes',W and V in Eqs. 4-29 and 4-30 can be replaced
by any matrices that effect a decompositionof Ao into its stable and unstable
invariant subspaces. Assuming that the system matrix is not significantly
affected by the failure, these matrices can be computed off-line. If the
failure effects on the system must be incorporated, the matrices can be com-
puted efficiently and accurately.
Finally, Eq. 4-24 can be rewritten as:
n n
: [ [ Wok£Ski£ j • (4-31)Wuij k=l £=1
where _ki£j = E{ABki AB£j}.
The objective is to maximize J in Eq. 4-22. This is to be achieved sub-
ject to the bandwidth limitations as expressed by Eq. 4-15. That is, we must
satisfy,
IIPCo(j_c - Ao)-I BfN_ _ i . (4-32)
Using the Schwarz inequality,
NPCo(j_ c - Ao)-i BfN, _ _PCo(j_ c - Ao)-I BfNoU . UNo-I Nil .
If we are dealing only with failures that result in decreased effectiveness
and/or decreased bandwidth, then
meCo(J_c - Ao)-I BfNo! _ nPCo(j_ c - Ao)-I BoNo! _ i
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where the last inequality comes from the assumption that the nominal LQ design
satisfies the bandwidth constraints as modeled by Eq. 4-15. Thus, Eq. 4-32
is achieved when N satisfies,
INo-I NI ( i • (4-32b)
Hence the objective of maximizing performance in the presence of control effec-
tiveness uncertainty is formulated as solving Eq. 4-22 subject to Eq. 4-32b.
4.3 SOLUTION OF THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
Define
Y = No-i N • (4-33)
Then Eqs. 4-22 and 4-32b become:
max Tr {yTwy } (4-34 )
subject to
#Y! _ i (4-35)
where
W = NoT[Wco - Wu]N o . (4-36)
The solution can be obtained in terms of the eigenvectors of W. Let the
columns of Y be an orthonormal basis for the invariant subspace (eigenspace)
of W corresponding to the nonnegative eigenvalues of W. Then Y solves Eqs.
4-34 through 4-36. The matrix N is given by
N = NoY (4-37)
and the design matrix R and is specified by
RN-I = N NT • (4-38)
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4.4 DISCUSSION
Objective 4-22 has a nice interpretation in terms of the effectiveness of
control on the important state variables. Recall that it was assumed that Co
has been chosen to reflect the relative importance of the various state vari-
ables to the performance of the aircraft. The matrix BiT Wo Bf then reflects
the amount of energy that can be transmitted to those variables, weighted by
their perceived importance, from each of the available control surfaces.
Hence, Eq. 4-22 captures the issue of quantifying control effectiveness via
the matrix Wco. Objective 4-22 also captures the issue of quantifying control
surface uncertainty through the matrix Wu. Hence, the objective is to maxi-
mize the beneficial feedback (Wco) minus the uncertainty (Wu).
The solution (Eqs. 4-37 and 4-38) reflects these issues. A negative
eigenvalue of W results only if uncertainty exceeds benefit in some direction.
This direction is represented by the corresponding eigenvector of W and is
eliminated from conslderatin in the control law design. Hence, the solution
eliminates those combinations of controls for which the control uncertainty
exceeds the control effectiveness within the feedback design.
The automatic design algorithm can be summarized as follows. It assumes
that a nominal LQ design has been chosen with nominal weights Co and Ro. It
also assumes that an FDI algorithm has indicated a control surface failure:
Step i: Form the matrices Bf and No.
Step 2: Compute W from Eqs. 4-23, 4-28 through 4-31 and 4-36.
Step 3: Find the eigenvectors Vl,...,v A corresponding to the
nonnegative eigenvalues of W. Define
N = No[Vl,...,vA] .
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Step 4: Compute
RN-I = N NT •
Step 5: Solve the LQ regulator problem
AoT K + KAo + CoTC o - KBfRN-I BfT K = 0
G = RN-I BfT K .
If Wu = 0, the solution of the automatic redesign optimization problem
(Eqs. 4-22 and 4-32) is almost trivial. Since
Wo > 0 (4-39)
the objective functional, J, (Eq. 4-22) is also positive for any choice of N,
and is monotonely nondecreasing as N increases in size. Thus, N should be
chosen as large as possible. The only constraint on N is the bandwidth con-
straint 4-32b. Hence the choice
N = No (4-40)
solves the automatic redesign problem.
Thus, in the case when information about control effector uncertainty is
not used by the automatic redesign procedure, the procedure simply solves a
LQ regulator problem with the new system description supplied by the FDI algo-
rithm and the nominal design quadratic weights Co and Ro. This has the advan-
tage of not requiring any computation to choose the design parameters. Yet,
since it is the solution to the automatic redesign optimization, this simple
procedure effectively maximizes the achievable performance within the band-
width constraints of the system.
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4.5 EXTENSION OF THE REDESIGN PROCEDURE FOR PLANTS WITH INTEGRATOR STATES
In this subsection, we modify the redesign procedure so that plants with
integrator states (poles at the origin) may be handled. Recall that when we
had unstable poles, a unique positive definite solution to the Lyapunov equa-
tion was obtained by evaluating the observabllity Grammlan for the same system
with the unstable poles reflected about the j_ axis. This procedure is neces-
sitated by the fact that the procedure for computing the grammian guarantees
a unique positive definite solution only when the system is stable. The
grammian obtained by this method solves the desired frequency integral for
the unstable system.
When the system has poles at the origin, the desired frequency integral
is infinite so we must modify the procedure to obtain meaningful answers. To
begin our discussion, recall that the redesign procedure is based on maximizing
some matrix norms of the frequency integral,
Wco = _ L(s) L(-s) H ds (4-41)
where
L(s) = C(sl - A)-I B (4-42)
and
Q = Cr C (4-43)
Furthermore, when the system has integator states, we can write,
A = _C_l _ (4-44)
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Q = " (4-47)
PIT QI
where
Qp = MpT Mp
QI --MIT MI
QPI = MpT MI .
Using Eqs. 4-44 through 4-47 in Eq. 4-22, we have
i
L(s) = Mp(Sl - Ap) -I Bp + _ MICI(sl _ Ap)-I Bp . (4-48)S
At low frequencies, the second term in Eq. 4-48 dominates while at high fre-
quencies, the first term is dominant. In the frequency region of interest,
both terms may be important.
The notion that a particular range of frequencies is of primary impor-
tance can now be exploited for our purposes. Suppose we define a new loop
transfer function,
Lw(s) = L(s) • W(s) . (4-49)
Then the integral (Eq. 4-41) using Lw(s ) instead of L(s) is just a frequency
weighted integral,
L(s) H(s) L(-s) H (4-50)
where
H(s) = W(s) W(-s) H . (4-51)
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The weighting W(s) can now be used to cancel the integrator poles and thereby
make Wco finite.
To see how this is implemented, consider a simple example with,
Is)W(s) = I • _ (4-52)s+a
Note that in general, one may want to use different frequency welghtlngs for
S
each loop (e.g., [W(s)]i i = _). Now although one could simply argue
s + ai
that the state matrix, A, with the additional dynamics for W(s), define a
new Q matrix, and solve the Lyapunov equation, this procedure will result in
numerical problems because of the implicit pole-zero cancellations. In order
to avoid these numerical problems, we perform the pole-zero cancellations
explicitly and develop a new A and Q matrix which results in the desired Wco
when the Lyapunov equation is solved.
Using Eqs. 4-52, 4-49,and 4-48, we have
s I
Lw(s ) = Mp(sl - Ap) -I Bp _ + MICI(sl - Ap) -I Bp _ . (4-53)
s+a s+a
Let W(s) be obtained from the minimal realization,
W(s) = Cw(sl - Aw)-i Bw + Dw (4-54)
with
Aw = -al
Bw = I
Cw = -al
Dw= I •
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If we define,
Aa " _B_w _ (4-55)
(4-56)
then it can be verified that
Lw(s) = Ca(sl - Aa)-I Ba (4-57)
with
Qp -aQp + QpiCl 1
Qa = CaTCa =
-aQpT + CITQpIT CITQICI + a2Qp _ aCITQpIT _ aQpiCl
(4-58)
Finally,
Wco= f Lw(s) Lw(-s)H ds (4-59)
is solved by the Lyapunov equation
AaTWo + WoTAa + Qa = 0 (4-60)
and
Wco = BaT Wo Ba • (4-61)
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SECTION 5
A PROTOTYPE RESTRUCTURABLE CONTROL SYSTEM
This subsection will give an explicit description of the entire restruc-
turable control system, so that the operation of the system can be seen.
5.1 PRELIMINARIES
We assume that we have our llnearlzed aircraft model in state-space form
x = Ax + Bu u c Rm Rnx
y = Cx Y _ RP (5-1)
xr = CrX xr £ Rn-p
E rE "C : I • 0 = 0 • I
pxp pxn-p n-pxp n-pxn-p
x r
where y are the important states that we would like to control very closely.
Note that we must have (A,B) a controllable pair and (A,C) an observable pair,
with rank (C) = p, rank (B)) p in order to independently control the output y.
While the automatic trim system will attempt to reduce the effect of dis-
turbances (e.g., stuck surfaces), there will always be some residual constant
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disturbance that we didn't predict. In order to reject this disturbance com-
pletely from those important states we need to add integrators. Thus, we form
the new augmented system
= + u (5-2)
x I C 0 x I 0
or
z = Az + Bu . (5-3)
We now pose the LQ problem for this augmented system:
Find u(t) to minimize
J = f [zTQz + uTRu] dt (5-4)
0
where Q = QT _ 0 is n+pxn+p and R = RT > 0 is mxm.
The solution is given by
u = -Gz = - y • Gr • GI xr (5-5)
xI
where
G = R-IBTK (5-6)
and K = KT _ 0 solves
0 --A_TK + K_ + Q - KBR-I'_TK . (5-7)
A command-following control system using this state-feedback gain G is shown
in Fig. 5-1. Here, r is the desired deviation from the setpoint Yo and is
controlled by the pilot through some input shaping filter•
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Fibre 5-1. Com_nd Following With LQ
Due to the integrators, we will achieve y = r + Yo exactly in steady state
(i.e., r _ constant)• The closed-loop system of Fig. 2-10 with r _ 0 is
z = _ + _[-Gz+ Uo+ GZo] (5-8)
where uo and zo are the setpoints desired by the automatic trim system. They
must satisfy
0 = Az o + _o " (5-9)
ExoNote that we are selecting zo = so that we can pick a setpoint forXlO
the integrator states xI. Suppose we pick xlO to be zero. That means that
the integrated xalue of y = Cx must be zero (since xI approaches xlO in steady
state) and in general, we will obtain an overshoot in our initial condition
response, even if all eigenvalues of A-BG are real. To see this, consider the
simple example in Fig. 5-2, with the initial conditions
x1(O)= 0 (5-10)
x2(O)= -1 (5-11)
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Figure 5-2. Simple Example Demonstrating Overshoot
Since the system is stable, xl,x2 both decay to zero, but
t
xl(t) = f X2(T)dT
o
(5-11 )
so that the area under x2(t) must go to zero - so we have overshoot. Note
that the eigenvalues of this system are -1 and -2 and are both real. To see
what the freedom in picking the initial condition of the integrator state
(xl here) can do for us, consider the eigenvectors of the A matrix associated
with the above system:
A = [-~ -~ ]
Al = -1 vl = [ .707l
-.707 -I
A2 = -2 v2 = [-~ ]
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ThusiweIckoE:]wehavextXo lndthereisnoovorshoot.
Another posslbillby would be to pick xo = _i__ and we would see only the
elgenvalue at -2, and thus a much faster response.
From this simple example, it seems very likely that the freedom of choosing
the integrator setpoint can have an impact on the resulting initial condition
response. This subject will remain a topic for future research and will not
be addressed any more in this report. It should be emphasized, however, that
this type of overshoot with well-damped poles does not occur in the command
response and is only important for determining the dynamic translent-response
to changes in setpoint.
5.2 A RESTRUCTURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
Now we are ready to put the whole system together. We link all the sub-
systems together as shown in Fig. 5-3. The Failure Detection and Isolation
(FDI) block determines when a failure has occurred and computes the new A and
B matrices for the aircraft. Since here we are only concerned with actuator
failures, only the B matrix will change. The automatic trim system block then
determines the best operating point for the aircraft, based on the solution of
the trim problem described in Section 3. This operating point is used by the
dynamic compensator (as in Fig. 5-1). The control redesign block also uses
the A,B matrices from the FDI block in order to compute the new gain matrix G
which is used by the dynamic compensator. The Q and R matrices are parameters
for the control redesign block and are computed from the redesign procedures
described in Section 4. Under no uncertainty, Q and R remain the same and G
is computed by solving the regulator problem with the new A and B matrices.
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Figure 5-3. Complete Restructurable Control System
The pilots commands go through a shaping filter before being introduced
into the control loop. This is to both mix the pilot commands (if necessary)
and to slow them down if necessary. They are mixed so that the pilot stick
commands are interpreted correctly by the control system. They are filtered
so that steps are not introduced into the control loops, thus reducing over-
shoots and control saturation. A possible form for a preshaping filter is
given in Fig. 5-4. Note that what the pilot controls is a deviation from the
operating point which is determined by the trim problem. Thus, if undesir-
able attitude coupling appears in the trim solution (e.g., side slip during a
rudder failure which necessitates a de-crab maneuver before touchdown) it can
be removed by the pilot through application of non-zero, constant r(t).
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Figure 5-4. Example of a Shaping Filter for the i-th Control Channel
Finally, the supervising block determines the flow and order of recon-
figuration actions. This block must decide on a variety of issues which
include:
I. Sequencing and fading of trim and redesign solution application,
2. Adequacy of trim solution and need to select a new operating
point,
3. Immediacy versus accuracy of trim solutions which require large
numbers of iterations for convergence,
4. Weightings and scalings of variables in the trim problem,
5. The need for refinement of redesign and trim solutions based
on more accurate FDI information, and
6. Logical interfacing with the pilot through a flight-director.
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SECTION 6
APPLICATION TO A TRANSPORT CLASS AIRCRAFT (BOEING 737 MODEL)
The automatic redesign procedure (presented in Section 4) and the auto-
matic trim solution (presented in Section 3) will be demonstrated in this
section on a llnearized model of a modified Boeing 737 aircraft. The model
is described in subsection 6.1. Subsection 6.2 develops the nominal state-
feedback design for the unfailed aircraft, and subsections 6.3 and 6.4 present
some linear analyses of the trim and redesign procedures.
6.1 AIRCRAFT MODEL "
A linearized model of the modified NASA Boeing 737 aircraft operating at
different flight conditions was supplied by NASA to ALPHATECH to demonstrate
the automatic design procedure. Since the aircraft potentially has nine inde-
pendent control surfaces, it is an ideal candidate for control restructuring.
For this demonstration, an operating point with a flight angle (y) of -3
degrees, pitch angle (0) of -.7 degrees, forward velocity (u) of 215 feet/sec,
downward velocity (w) of 8.7 feet/sec, and altitude of 1500 ft was chosen.
The flaps are set at 40 degrees•
The linear aircraft model is in the form
Xa(t) = Aa Xa(t) + Ba Ua(t) (6-1)
where Xa(t) is a state vector of the linear aircraft dynamics and Ua(t ) is the
vector of available control surfaces• The state vector is given by
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u forward velocity, ft/sec
w vertical velocity, ft/sec
q pitch rate, tad/see
e pitch angle, rad
Xa = = (6-2)
v side velocity, ft/sec
p roll rate, rad/sec
r yaw rate, rad/sec
roll angle, rad
The NASA model included a nlnth state for yaw angle which was eliminated
since it will not be controlled by the regulation system. The longitudinal
dynamics are decoupled from the lateral dynamics in the unfailed aircraft.
The first four states represent the longitudinal dynamics and the second four
represent the lateral dynamics.
The input vector is given by
_LT left engine thrust, ibs
_RT right engine thrust, ibs
6LS left stabilator, deg
_RS right stabilator, deg
Ua = _R = rudder, deg (6-3)
_LE left elevator, deg
_RE right elevator, deg
_LA left aileron, deg
_RA right aileron, deg
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The system matrix for this operating condition is given by
"-0.03735 0.1055 -8.692 -32.17 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
-0.2763 -0.7054 215.41 0.4196 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-0.0002007 -0.006228 -0.5193 -0.0003222 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 O.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
A a "
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1451 10.35 -214.5 32.17
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.01685 -I.529 0.8053 0.000003381
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.003239 -0.1212 -0.1458 -0.004113
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -0.0120 0.0D m
(6-4)
The input matrix is given by
m
0.0003785 0.0003785 0.006813 0.006813 0.0 0.003265 0.0032660 0.003647 0.003647--
-0.0000002952 -0.0000002952 -0,1688 -0.1688 0.0 -0.08093 -0.08093 -0.09037 -0,09037
0.000006263 0.000006263-0.0221 -0.0221 0.0 -0.01059 -0.01059 -0.002849 -0.002849
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ba m
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1389 0.0 0.0 0.0004774-0.0004774
0.000002128-0.000002128 0.007411 -0,007411 0.009317 0.003552 -0.003552 0.008208 "0.008208
0.00001245 -0.00001245 0.0004336-0.0004336-0.0109 0.0002637-0.0002637 0.0007019-0.0007019
-- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(6-5)
The open-loop eigenvalues of the aircraft are:
Longitudinal I Short Period: -0.614 ± l.Sj
) Phugold: -0.0167 ± 0.17j
I Dutch Roll: -.058 ± 1.106j
Lateral Spiral: -.0063
Roll Subsidence: -1.699
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6.2 CONTROLLER DESIGN
This subsection describes the design process followed to arrive at the
final state-feedback controller. Since the longitudinal and lateral dynamics
are decoupled for the unfailed aircraft, we can design them separately. To
decouple the inputs, we need to mix them to obtain differentlal and collective
inputs. We do this as follows. Let
0 0 i I 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 I I 0 0
i I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i i
BMI x _ 0 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 9 x9 (6-6)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I -i
0 0 I -i 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 i -I 0 0
i -I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SO
UNE W = BMI X • ua
where
6CS collective stabilator
6CE collector elevator
Longitudinal
_CT collective thrust
6CA collective aileron
Une w = = (6-7)
dR rudder
6DA differential aileron
6DS differential stabilator Lateral
_ DE differential elevator6 T _ _ f rential thrust
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We now need to scale the inputs according to their maximum values. Note that
we cannot define absolute maximum limits for dlfferentlal and collectlve
Inputs independently. However, as we are just using thls to scale the Inputs
so things are weighted correctly D it is not as important. We pick the scaling
for the new inputs as follows
Up = SI-I Une w
where
SI _ dlagIlO,20,1000,20,20,20,10,20,1000) • (6-8)
We then let
BI = Ba(BMIX) -I SI (6-9)
be our new B matrix, which is mixed and scaled•
In order to make the state variables easier to work with, we would llke
to scale them so that I unit in each of the state variables is approximately
equivalent in terms of importance. If we choose
Xp = TI • xa (6-10)
where
TI = diag_O.01,0.01,1,1,0.Ol,l,l,l) (6-11)
then our new system matrices are
Ap = TI • Aa • TI-I (6-12)
Bp = TI • BI (6-13)
and the linear aircraft model becomes
Xp = Ap Xp + Bp Up .
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We can now split the aircraft model into a longitudinal model and a
lateral model, and devise an LQ design for each of these.
6.2.1 Lateral Design
The lateral model is given by
"--0.1451 0.1035 -2.1450 0.3216
-1.6853 -1.5292 0.8053 0.0000
ALAT = (6-14)
0.3239 -0.1212 -0.1458 -0.0041
|o.oooo 1.oooo -o.o12o o.ooooL-.
0.0278 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.1863 0.1642 0.0741 0.0710 0.0021
BLAT = (6-15)
-0.2180 0.0140 0.0043 0.0053 0.0124
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
The states are the scaled versions of the lateral states, viz.,
--v/100_ --side velocity, ft/sec|
p -- roll rate, rad/sec
x = i = (6-16)
r 1 yaw rate, rad/sec
$ roll angle, rad
and the scaled inputs are
6R/20
_DA/20
u = _DS/10 (6-17)
_DE/20
_ _DT/I000
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One of the goals we would llke to achieve in the lateral axis is auto-
matically coordinated flight. _e way to achieve this approximately is to
control s_de-veloclty and bank angle• _us, a nonzero commanded bank angle
with a zero-commanded side velocity would produce a steady turn, with only a
s_ll residual side acceleration that the p_lot can eliminate with the side
velocity controls (rudder pedals)• _is also allows for coordinated turns
with failures, without the pilot having to worry about the coordination of
the turn•
Thus, we decide to control side velocity, v, and bank angle, _. To
eliminate steady-state errors, we put integrators on those states• Let
1 0 00]
CLAT = (6-18)
0 0 0 I
so that
y = = CLA T x (6-19)
_r new augmented plant is given by
= = + u (6-20)
xI CLA r 0 _ L Xl 0
or
• _ ~ (6 21)z = +Bu .
Our first trial was
R = I
Q = I .
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The resulting closed-loop elgenvalues are
-0.377 ± 1.200J
-1.7058
-0.435 ± 0.269j
-0.139
These closed-loop eigenvalues are too lightly damped. So, in order to increase
the damping, we increased the weighting on the roll rate. In addition, in
order to raise the integrator action somewhat, we Increased the weights on the
two integrator states. We finally settled on
R = I (6-22)
m
3 0 0 0 0 0
0 20 0 0 0 0
0 0 i 0 0 0
QLAT = (6-23 )
0 0 0 I 0 0
0 0 0 0 4O 0
0 0 0 0 0 40
which produced closed-loop eigenvalues of
-0.855 ± 1.50j
-.616 ± 0.504j
-1.877
-1.104
and a state-feedback gain matrix of
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8.0152 -0.8558 -12.6637 -2.8876 5.9409 -2.1514 --
-2.6946 5.1579 5.5219 10.3317 1.8254 5.0554
GLT I -1.1336 2.2747 2.3427 4.5473 0.8477 2.2211 (6-24)
-1.1340 2.2109 2.3305 4.4249 0.7986 2.1638
-0.5543 0.4002 1.0030 0.8584 -0.1300 0.4463
By examining the individual elements of GLT , we can determine that the control
gains are not too large and are quite acceptable. Remember that the inputs
and states have been scaled.
The singular values of the scaled loop transfer function for this final
design are given in Fig. 6-1. The dominant contributing inputs to each loop
are shown on the plot, as determined by examining the left singular vectors.
The loop transfer function crossover frequency of about 3 rad/sec provides
sufficient bandwidth for command following and adequate stability margins.
Figure 6-2 shows the singular values of the loop broken at the error signal
for command following (x in Fig. 5-1). They look quite good and we expect
the lateral subsystem to follow v and _ commands very well. Figure 6-3 shows
the singular values of the closed-loop map from reference inputs to actual
outputs. We expect it to follow commands well out to about i rad/sec, and do
extremely well out to O.1 rad/sec.
6.2.2 Longitudinal Design
The longitudinal model we have is given by
---0.0374 0.1055 -0.0869 -0.3217 --
-0.2763 -0.7054 2.1541 0.0042
ALON = (6-25)
-0.0201 -0.6228 -0.5193 -0.0003
0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
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Figure 6-1. Singular Values of Lateral Loop at Plant Input
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Figure 6-2. Singular Values of Lateral Loop at Error Signal
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Figure 6-3. Singular Values of Closed-Loop Command to Outputs
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0.0007 0.0007 0.0038 0.0007 --
-0.0169 -0.0162 0.0000 -0.0181
BLON = (6-26)
-0.2210 -0.2118 0.0063 -0.0570
o.oo00 o.oooo o.oooo o.o0oo
with states
4
Fu/IO0-- forward velocity, ft/sec
I downward velocity, ft/sec
w/100
x = = (6-27)
l q pitch rate, rad/sec
0 pitch angle, radm
and inputs
I -_cs/lO_CE/20
u = (6-28)
I _CT/IO00
_CA/20 -J
At first, it was decided to control just pitch angle in the longitudinal
axis. The pilot's thrust control would then be used as a setpoint for the
control system, with the feedback system making adjustments to that setpoint.
In order to control pitch angle with zero error in steady state, we
augment the system with an integrator on pitch angle. Let
CLO N = [ 0 0 0 i ] (6-29)
so that
8 = CLO N x (6-30)
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Then our new (augmented) system model becomes
°°]E]E°]• ffiz ffi + u (6-31)xI CLO N 0 xI 0
or
We then proceed to design an LQ regulator for this augmented model. We used
RLO N = I (6-32)
and tried several diagonal Q matrices. However, we could not get the eigen-
values sufficiently far into the left-half plane to obtain satisfactory speeds
of response, so we used the following trick. We let
AT = A + al (6-33)
for _ = 0.I. We then solve the LQ problem for some Qo and Ro matrices using
AT and B. This corresponds to solving the problem of minimizing
J = f e2at[ xTQx + uTRu ]dt • (6-34)
0
When the resulting state-feedback matrix G is used with the matrix _, we are
guaranteed that
Re{li(_-BG)} _ - e , i = 1,2,...,n+p . (6-35)
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In order to be able to recalculate this G with the normal Rlccatl equa-
tion, we note that the R_ccatl equation for this problem is
0 = K[_+_I] + [_+_I ]T K + Qo - KBRo-IBTK (6-36)
or
0 = K_ + ArK + [Qo+2O_K] - K_Ro-I_T K . (6-37)
Therefore, if we solve Eq. 6-36 for K, then Eq. 6-37 shows that the solution
is identical to the standard solution with
QLON = Qo + 2c_K . (6-38)
We have, as usual, G = -Ro-IBK. The computationof QLON in Eq. 6-38 is nec-
essary for redesign purposes. We selected
2 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0
Qo = 0 0 40 0 0 . (6-39)
i00000j0 0 0 0 60
The heavy weighting on the pitch rate state tends to help damp those modes
associated with it and the weighting on the integrator state brings the inte-
grator action (as seen in the singular values) up to a suitable level.
The singular values of the loop transfer function for this design are
shown in Fig. 6-4. Note that the loop corresponding to thrust is quite low.
This implies that those states which are regulated using collective thrust
will not be regulated very well. By projecting the left singular vector cor-
responding to this loop onto the space spanned by the columns of the G matrix
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Figure 6-4. Singular Values of Longitudinal Loop at Input
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for this design, we see that forward velocity is the dominant state being con-
trolled at low frequencies for this loop. Thus, we would expect inadequate
regulation of u from this design. This is shown in Fig. 6-5 which gives the
scaled closed-loop response to a step in commanded pitch angle.
While this design may be adequate for a pilot in the loop control systems,
our present goal is to develop a control law which can be demonstrated auto-
nomously on the NASA-Langley Research Center nonlinear simulation. Therefore,
better regulation of forward velocity (u) is desired. Several designs which
brought the thrust loop up to a higher level at low frequencies were examined.
However, none were able to achieve good steady state regulation without severely
reducing the robustness of the design to the highly significant throttle
dynamics. For this reason, we added an integrator state corresponding to the
integral of forward velocity.
With this additional integrator, the augmented system model is given by
Eq. 6-31 with
CLON = • (6-40)
I 0 0 0
Initially, we tried using the trick described by Eqs. 6-33 through 6-38 with,
Qo = diag[2, 2, 40, 6, 60, 2] (6-41)
(which is the same as Eq. 6-39 with an additional weight for the integral of
u state). This design produced good steady state regulation of u and good
robustness to engine dynamics, but resulted in too much control action in _CA"
In order to keep the singular values of the scaled loop transfer function the
same and shift the control action from _CA to 6CT , the diagonal element of the
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Figure 6-5. Scaled Closed Loop Response to Pitch Angle Step Command
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RLO N corresponding to thrust was decreased by a factor of ten and the rows
and columns of the Q matrix computed from Eq. 6-41 and Eqs. 6-33 through 6-38
which correspond to welghtlngs on u and fu were also reduced by a factor of
ten. The result is,
NEO N = dlag[l, I, .I, I] (6-42)
D
69.7531 9.5838 -3.1061 -19.7252 13.6632 1.3749 --
9.5838 4.5549 -1.6185 -6.0149 1.5320 0.1662
QLON = -3.1061 -1.6185 46.2520 11.1358 5.3199 -0.0729 (6-43)
-19.7252 -6.0149 11.1358 46.2064 16.8045 -0.3857
13.6632 1.5320 5.3199 16.8045 88.8258 0.1769
1.3749 0.1662 -0.0729 -0.3857 0.1769 0.6618m
and
1.3978 1.4598 -6.8311 -11.6557 -6.2575 0.1939 --
1.3388 1.3988 -6.5467 -11.1701 -5.9972 0.1858
GEON = (6-44)
27.9237 3.8726 1.4870 -4.0887 10.0066 2.4249
-0.8064 0.1156 -1.6578 -2.4716 -1.9209 -0.0407
The singular values of the scaled loop transfer function for this design are
shown in Fig. 6-6. The design has adequate robustness to engine dynamics and
improves the regulation of u during a pitch step as shown in Fig. 6-7. Of
course, increased use of thrust is made during the pitch step of .i radian.
In fact, it requires about 8000 ibs. of collective thrust in the steady state
to regulate forward velocity during this maneuver. This is deemed reasonable.
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The closed loop e_genvalues are
-1.17 ± .97J
-1.07
(6-45)
-.71
-.I0 ± .02j
Figure 6-8 shows the closed loop command following singular values.
Based on th_s f_gure, velocity following is good to about .05 r/s and pitch
angle follow_ng is good to about 2 r/s.
6.2.3 Global Design
We can now assemble the two subsystem designs into one global design.
To do this, we simply set
i
ALo N 0 _
AGLOB = 12×12 (6-46)
0 ALA T
L_FBLON 0
BGLOB = I 12x9 (6-47)
0 BLA T
where (ALoN,BLON) is the augmented longitudinal subsystem and (ALAT,BLAT) is
the augmented lateral subsystem. We continue
QGLOB = 12x12 (6-48)
0 QLAT
RLo N 0
RGLOB = 9x9 (6-49)
0 RLA T
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Figure 6-8. Closed Loop Singular Values for Command Following
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and we can solve one large Riccatl equation to get the feedback gain
GLo N 0
- 9x12 (6-50)
GGLOB 0 GLA T
where GLO N and GLA T should equal the gains we calculated in the previous two
subsections (6.2.1 and 6.2.2).
We would llke to convert our feedback gain back to the original inputs
and states, so that it can be used on the full nonlinear simulation. Since
Xp = TI • xa (6-51)
Up = Sl-i • BMI X • ua (6-52)
and our regulator design minimizes
oo
J = f [XpT QGLOB Xp + upT RGLO B Up]d t (6-53)0
for Xp and up scaled. We could use
J = f=[XaugT QFXaug + ua RFUa]dt (6-54)
0
where XaugT = (xaT , CxaT )
and
Aa 0
AF = 12x12 (6-55)
C 0
 Ba]BF -- 12 x9 (6- 56 )0
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IO 0 0 1 0 0 0 07C = 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 J (6-57)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
so that
Xaug = AF Xaug + BF Ua (6-58)
and
q
0
V
-- Cxa • (6-59)
u
We then define a larger scaling matrix
C )T2 = diag .01, .01, i, I, I, .01, • .01, I, i, i, .01, 1 (6-60)
where we must scale the integrator states too, and a permutation matrix P
i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0-7
O i O O O O O O O 0 O O
0 i O
I 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 0 O
p = O O O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 12x12
0 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 O 0
0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 O 0 0 i 0 0 0 O 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 O
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0
O 0 0 0 0 O O 0 0 0 i O (6-61)
in order to mix the integrator states back into the order we used for AGLOB.
Then we use
QF = pT . T2T . QGLOB " T2 " P (6-62)
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and
RF - (SI-I BMIX)T • RGLOB • ISl-I • BMIX) (6-63)
with the model (Eqs. 6-55 and 6-56) to obtain a state feedback matrix which
corresponds to the scaled design versions (i.e., same physical feedback). The
matrices are
I.IO00D-06 -9.0000D-07 O.OOOOD+'O0 O.OO00D+OO O.OOOOD+-OO O.O000D+O0 0.OOOOI>+O0 O.OO001)+O0 O.OOOOD+-O0 --
-9.0000D-07 I .IOOOD-06 O. OOOOD+.OO O. O00OI>+OO O. OOOOM O.O000D+O0 O. OOOOD+OO 0.0000D+OO O. O0001>+OO
O.OO00D+O0 0.00OOD+OO 2 .OOOOD-O20 .OOOOD+O00. OOO0D-H)O O.0000I>+O0 O.O00OD+O0 O.O0001>_0 O.O000D-H)O
O.O000D+O0 O.OOOOD+O0O.OOOOD+O02.0000D-02 O.OOOOD+O0O.O000D+O0 O.OOOOI>+OO.O00OD+O0 O.OOOOI>+O0
P'F" 0.O000D+O0 0.0000D+O0 0.OO00D+O0 0.00001)+O0 2.50001)-.O3O.00001)+O0 0.O00OD+O0 0.O000D+O0 0.00OOD+.O0
O.O000D+O0 0.0000D+O0 0.0000D+O0 O.O000D+O0 0.0000D+O0 5.0000D-03 0.OO00D+O0 O.0000D+O0 0.O000D+O0
O.O000D+O0 0.O000D+O0 O. 0000D+O0 0. O000D+O0 O. 0000D+O0 O. 0000D+O0 5.0000D-03 O.O000D+O0 O. O00OD+O0
O. O000D+O0 O.O000D+O0 O.OOOOD+O0 O.O000D+O0 O.O000D+O0 O.O000D+O0 O. OOOOD+OO 5.0000D-03 O. O00OD+OO
--O.O000D+O0 O.OO00D+O0 O.O000D+O0 O.O000D+O0 O.OO00D+O0 O.0000D+O0 O.OOOOD+OO O.OO00D+O0 5.0OOOD-03__
(6-64)
6.9753D--O3 9.$838D-O4 -3.1061D-O2 -1.9725_--0! O.OOOOD_OO O.OOOOD+OO 0.OOOO_-00 0.OOOO_'.OO 1.3_3D-Ol 0.0OO0_+00 0.0OOOC_30 1.37_9D--O4
9.58_$D--OA A.5549D-O4 *L*6Z85D-O2 -6.0149D--O2 O.(XX)OD4430 0.OO_3D*_O O.OOOOD_O_ 0.O_OOD_OO Z.5320D"02 O,OOOOD*O0 O.O0_3D*_O L*6616D--0_
-3.10%ID-O2 -l.&185D-O2 4.625EP+O1 1.1136D_O1 O.0OOOD+OO O.0OOOD_O_ 0.O(X)O_ 0.00OOD_OO 5.3199D+00 O.OOOOD+OO O.OOOOD+00 -7.2934D-O4
-1.9725_,-01 ,_.0149D-O2 1.11361_"O1 4.62OE1_O! 0.0OO0_+00 O.OOOOC_OO 0.OOOO_-00 0.0OO01)_30 1.680_I_-01 O.OO0_D_30 0.0OO0_OO -3.$}71D-03
O. OOOOD+OO O. OOOOD*<)O 0.0OOOD'e-_ O.OOOOD+OO 3. 0000_34 0. OOOOD+OO 0. OOOOD+O0 0. OOOOD*O0 0 .OO_ 0,*-OO O. 00_ D,6,00 0. 00000._OO O.0OOOD,_O
O. O_D-'OO O.OOOOD+OO O.OOOOD_ 0.00_D_00 0,0000D*OO 2.0000D_Ol O.OOOOD+OO 0.OOOOD*OO 0.OOOOC_<)O O .OOCOD_ O.OOOOD*OO O.OOOOD+OO
0. OOOOD+OO 0.OC_D*OO 0. OO0_D*OO 0 •OOOOD'*OO 0. OOOOD+OO 0.OOO_ D-'OO 1. O0_)0._O0 0. O000D',,O0 O.OQOOD.,OO 0.00_OD_O 0.0000D+OO O.OOOOD+O0
0 .OOOOD+OO 0 .0_0 D.*-OO O.OO0_D_OO 0.0OO0_00 0. OOOOD+O0 0.00_D,.OO 0. OOOOD+OO 1. 00_O_O O. _O0_,O0 0. OOOOD,OO 0.0OOOD.,O0 0.0OOO_.00
I. 3663D--O1 !. 5320D-O2 S. 3199D_00 1.6804_.01 0.0OOOD4-_O 0. O(X3OI>+OO O. OOOOD*OO 0. OOOOD+OO |.8826D_'O1 O. OOOOC+OO O. OOOODº*_O 1• 7685D-'03
O .0OOOC_-O0 0.0000D_OO 0.0OOOD*_O 0.0OOCD_OO O.0OOOD_OO O.(XX)OD*OO 0.0OOO_)_00 O.0OOOD_OO 0.0OO0_OO _.OOOOD-O3 0.OOOOD_OO 0.O0_D_)O
0. OOOOO'_O O. OOOOD'_O O. OOO_D+OO 0. OOOOD--OO O.OOOOD+_ 0. OOOOD--OO 0. OOOOD+00 0.0OOOD*OO 0.0OO_D-"OO O.OOOOD._O _ .OO_D+O1 O.OOOOD'_O
1.3749D--O4 1.66160-O5 -?.293_D-O4 -3.8571D-O3 0.0OOOD.,-OO 0.OOOOD_OO 0.OOOOD_OO O.OOOOI>,.O0 1.768-8D-O3 O.0_OOD+OO O.OOOOD+OO 6.6181D-05
(6-65)
-- 1.39&IF+O2 1.9358IM'O! 7._412D+O2 -2.0_27D+03 -2.771_1>,w30 2.OOIOD',O2 5.O151D'_O2 4.29190*02 5.0039D','O3 "-_.5(X_TD-OI 2.2317D_-O2 1.2124E_4DI
1.3961D*_2 1.9358D'_'01 7._412C,_O2 -_.0427D4-O3 2._713C-,'OO -2.OOIOD'_32 -5.0151D+g2 -4.29|9D4-02 5.0_3qD'*_3 6.5OO7D--01 -2.23l?D+O2 1.2|2_D+Ol
7.OO_2D-O2 7.3015D-O2 -3.6156D4-O1 -_.8283I>+O1 -5.66801>-02 1.137_I>,_01 1.1716C"O1 2.2737D.w01 -3.12821_'01 _.238_D-02 I.IIO_D'_31 9.71160--03
7.00_2D-02 7.3Ol5D-02 -3.4156D+01 -}.8283D+0! 5._68OD-O2 o1.1374I>"O1 -1.1714D'_01 -2.2737I>,'01 -3.12_2P,'O1 "-4.2385P-02 -I.II0%D_OI _.?i14D--03
_7 " 1.29OID-15 2.9076{)-16 -3._417D-I_ -5.2611D-1_ 1.60301>,-00 *I*711_D'_01 -2.5327D'_32 -_.7752I)*O1 1.0922D-14 1.18_82D'W)O -4.3027D+O1 2.0720D-16
1.336OD-O1 1.398_D--O1 -_.5_66D'_O1 -I.|169;>,'O2-l.1340D-Ol ._.2109D',-O1Z.33051_01 4._249D-'O! -5.9980D-'O1 7.9_58D-O2 2.163_D_01 1.8_5_D--O2
1.33_OD-O1 1.398_D-'O1 -_.5466D+O1 -1.|1_9D-,'O2 1.1340D--O1 -2.2109i>,'O1 -2.3305D'_O1 -4.4_491>,-01 -5.998OD',-O| -7.985H2 -2.1638D+O1 l.gS_SD-O2
-_.0708I)--O2 1.1551D--02 -I.6578D4K)I -2._714D','01 -2.6946D-O1 5.15791>"O1 5.52191>_01 1.0332D_2 -I._211D_01 1.825_D-01 5.055_D-'01 -4.0715D-O3
-8.O708D-02 1.1551D-O2 -I.6578D+OI -2.471_D_O1 2,694_-0! -5.1579D_01 -5.5219_._1 -I.0332_+O2 oI._211_'_I -I.$ZS&D-OI -5,055_O! -4.0751D-O3
(6-66)
85
These matrlces can now be used with the original scaling and organization of
inputs.
Let
Gy -- [G4 G5 G8 GI] (6-67)
Gr = [G2 G3 G6 G7] (6-68)
GI = [G9 GIO GII GI2] (6-69)
where Gi is the Ith column of GF in Eq. 6-66 .
Then the equations of the compensator are:
xI = -r + Cxa - Cxo (6-70)
u = uo - GrX r - GyCx a + GyCx o + Gyr - GlX I (6-71)
where
0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0
C = 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 (6-72)
0 0 O 0 0 0 0 i
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
xr = Crxa
m
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cr = 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 (6-73)
0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0
and uo and xo are the desired setpoints.
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6.2.4 Summary of Nominal Control Design
A variety of linear simulations of the unfailed aircraft were performed.
These included responses to command steps with and without wind gusts. For
the gust simulations, the Dryden wind model [32] was used with a i000 ft. tur-
bulence scale length in the vertical and horizontal directions and a low rms
velocity (_ = 2 ft/s).
Since these linear simulations resemble the nonlinear simulation results
described in Section 7, we forego discussion of these results at this point.
6.3 INVESTIGATION OF TRIM SOLUTIONS FOR STUCK FAILURES
In this subsection, we provide some results of applying the quadratic
programming algorithm described in Section 3 to the linear trim problem for a
landing approach scenario. We assume, as usual, that sufficient information
about the failure is made available from the FDI algorithm (see Fig. 5-3).
Scenario Definition
The normal (unfailed) operating point for a B-737 aircraft flying at 127
knots, I000 feet, and a -3 degree flight path angle is given by the nominal
state vector, xn,
u I = 215 ft/s = velocity along the x-body axis
w = 8.7 ft/s = velocity along the z-body axis
q -- 0 r/s -- angular velocity about y-body axis
8 = -.68 deg. = pitch angle
Xn = Iv = 0 f/s = velocity along the y-body axis
I
!/ = 0 r/s = angular veloclty about x-body axlsi z i= 0 deg. -- roll angle (6-74)
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and the nominal input vector, Un,
- 4251 ibs - left engine thrust
= 4251 Ibs = right engine thrust
= -5.45 deg. = left stabJlator deflection
6RS = -5.45 deg. = right stabilator deflection
Un = 6R = 0 deg. = rudder deflection
_LE = 0 deg. = left elevator servo deflectlon
= 0 deg. = right elevator servo deflection
= 0 deg. = left aileron deflection
= 0 deg. = right right aileron deflection (6-75)
The above flight condition includes a 40 degree flap extension, no spoiler
deflection and extended landing gear at a gross weight of 85,000 pounds.
A linear model for the aircraft about this operating point is given by
Eqs. 6-1 through 6-5. For this investigation, we will assume that the measur-
able disturbance (Wp in Eq. 3-6) which we wish to reject is caused by a stuck
failure of a control element. That is, the disturbance Wp, in each of the
cases we will examine takes the form
Wp = Adi bl (6-76)
where Adi is the difference between the stuck value of the i'th control element
and its nominal value, and bi is the i'th column of the B matrix in Eq. 6-1.
Regulated Variables
As demonstrated in [18], the choice of important quantlties, y, for trim
regulation greatly impacts the resulting solution. When y = x, for example,
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the linear trim problem results in a balancing of the force and moment dlstur-
bances by forces and moments applied by the control elements alone. While
this result may satisfactorily reject the disturbances, the amount of remaining
control authority available for use in controlling the airplane is substan-
tially smaller than when other choices of y are made.
For the current demonstration, our choice of y is motivated by two
factors. First a landing approach scenario, the primary objective should be
to maintain the desired approach flight path angle (in this case -3 degrees).
If this objective is met, and the aircraft can achieve it in a steady state
condition (i.e., x=-O) then runway intercept can be achieved as long as the
pilot/control-system has sufficient remaining control authority to establish/
re-establish the desired altitude and heading. Note that, while one m_ght
specify heading angle as a desired regulated variable, the trim solution will
not achieve the desired heading on its own. This is due to the fact that,
while the trim problem guarantees that its solution is an equilibrium point
for the system (Eq. 6-1), it does not guarantee that application of the re-
sulting nominal control values will achieve the solution unless the system is
strictly stable. Since heading angle appears as an integrator state in the
open loop aircraft, it can only be chosen as a regulated quantity if a heading
loop is present in the control system. Also, the solution to the trim problem
(if feasible) guarantees that the linear system used to approximate the air-
craft is in steady state. To insure that the true aircraft is in steady
state, the nonlinear equations of motion must be examined. The kinematic
equations relating angular rates to Euler angles (e.g., see [33]), suggest
that we can achieve constant Euler angles (e.g., e = _ = 0) by requiring that
all angular rates equal zero (i.e., P = Q = R = 0). If the linear model used
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in solving the trim problem corresponds to zero nominal angular rates, then we
will achieve steady state flight by requiring the angular rate perturbations to
be zero.
For the results that follow, yT = (y,q,p,r), where y represents perturba-
tions to the desired (nominal) flight path angle, and p,q,r represent pertur-
bations to the desired (nominal) angular rates. As in [18], the flight path
angle, y, is nonllnearly related to the states in Eq. 6-74. The C matrix
needed in Eq. 3-7 is, therefore, composed of the linear coefficients of the
Taylor expansion for this relationship. As shown in [18], we have
.00019 -.00465 0 i 0 0 0 0-_C = 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 _ (6-77)
0 0 0 0 0 i 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0
Note that in the above, the constraint q = 0 is redundant for this linear
trim problem since at this operating point (Eqs. 6-74 and 6-75) e = q. Thus
q = 0 is already specified by the linear trim problem by the requirement x = O.
Constraints
In order to make the solution to the linear trim problem reasonable, we
must constrain the states and controls to the linear and realizable region
of the model in Eq. 6-1. First, we assume that the absolute limits on each
control are given by
_Lr, _RT € [1600, 17,000] ibs
6LS, _RS € [-14, 3] degrees
_R _ [-I0, i0] degrees (6-78)
6LE, _RE g [-i0, i0] degrees
_LA, _RA _ [-i0, i0] degrees
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Furthermore, we would llke to leave about 5 degreees of control authority
for each control surface so that these controls do not saturate when used
dynamically.
The linear region in state space is determined by a number of factors.
I. For nonviscous flows such as those encountered in most aircraft,
the llft and drag forces caused by control surface deflection
is approximately proportional to dynamic pressure or, equiva-
lently, to total velocity squared. Thus, each B matrix element
can be written
Bij = 8ijV2 = Bij(Vn+v)2 (6-79)
where Vn is the nominal total velocity and v is the perturba-
tion to Vn. For an allowable error of 20 percent in the B
matrix we must require that
8ij(Vn+v)2 - 8ijVn2 _ .28ijVn2 (6-80)
For v << 2Vn, Eq. 6-80 is true for Iv[ < .iVn or about
20 ft/sec.
2. For the flight path angle linearization (represented by C
in Eq. 6-77) to be valid, perturbations to Vx and Vz must be
limited. If we plot values of true y versus linear predicted
for various combinations of Vz and Vx, we see that the error
in y can be limited to.5 degrees by requiring perturbations to
Vx to be smaller than 20 ft/sec., and perturbations to Vz to
lie about within the range [-30, 20] ft/sec. Of course, if we
limit the angle of attack to a presumably linear range of 0
to I0 degrees, the constraint on perturbations to Vz becomes
roughly [-8.7, 20] ft/sec.
3. Assuming a linear envelope of plus and minus 5 degrees sideslip
angle, the side velocity perturbation limits are roughly plus
and minus 19 ft/sec. (based on a maximum velocity magnitude of
Vn + v = 215 + 20 = 225 ft/sec.).
4. For a landing approach, the attitude of the aircraft must be
such that the pilot can see the runway, and a safe landing
achieved. This implies that O be within the range of about
plus and minus i0 degrees and _ be within about ±5 degrees.
5. Since we will be minimizing perturbations to P, Q, and R, limits
on these values are arbitrary. In the algorithm definition,
we will use limits of [-_, _] radians/sec, which will never be
active. However, in cases where P, Q, and R are not regulated,
we might require IPl _ 3 deg/s and IQI,IRI _ 15 deg/s.
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Results
One of the most important factors in obtaining a fast and meaningful solu-
tion to the linear trim problem is the scaling of the solution variables. As
mentioned in [18], we can reflect the relative importance of the various ele-
ments in x and u by choosing a diagonal weighting or scaling matrix S such that
= S-lz
where z is the vector of states and controls given by zT = (xT,uT). Referring
to the quadratic programming problem (Eq. 3-14), the new (scaled) cost J2 becomes
_2 = (FS _- d)T(Fs _ - d) (6-81)
and the solution, z is given by z = Sz. The objective Jl will be the Euclidean
-- S-izL -- S-Izu.norm of z, and the constraints on z are _ z
The use of the scaling matrix S as detailed above implies that variables
which have large scale factors tend to be used more in the final solution.
For the purposes of this investigation, a reasonable choice of scale factors
result when the remaining "authority" of each variable is used as its scaling.
That is, if the limit on zi is symmetric about zero and equal to zLi , then Sii
is set equal to zLi. This will mean that variables whose nominal values are
far from their limits will be used more in achieving the minimum norm solution.
Also, this scaling implies that the scaled limits on zi are -i < z--i _ I.
Summarizing, the parameters of the quadratic programming algorithm (Eq.
3-14) for this investigation, we have,
zLT = (-20,-8.7,-3,-0.20,-19,-3,-3,-.09,-2650, (6-82)
-2650,-3.5,-3.5,-5,-8,-8,-5,-5)
zuT = (20,20,3,.20,19,3,3,.09,7750,7750,3.5, (6-83)
3.5,5,2,2,5,5)
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(i.e., S is a diagonal matrix with the values of zU given in Eq. 6-83 along
its diagonal)
I-w)d -- (6-86 )0
Table 6-1 presents the linear trim solutions for disturbances, w, corre-
sponding to single stuck or frozen control elements at non-zero positions (as
in Eq. 6-76).
The engine failure (first column in the table) corresponds to a total
loss of thrust. In this case, the failure is compensated by applying a large
thrust to the remaining engine and then compensating for the remaining imbal-
ances by a combination of surface deflections and state perturbations. The
resulting flight-path angle can be computed by applying the perturbations of
Vx, Vz and e to the nominal values in Eq. 6-74 and 6-75 and computing the
resulting value of y = e - arctan(Vz/V x) = -3.5 degrees. Note that the total
Vy and _ values are nonzero indicating that the aircraft is using a sideslip
configuration to reject some of the lateral disturbances. This effect, and
the use of nonzero perturbations of Vx, Vz, and 6, we will call "attitude
coupling." The use of attitude coupling in the tr_m solution allows the air-
craft to achieve the desired condition (x=O, Y=Yd) w_th smaller values of sur-
face deflection as compared to the case where forces and moments are balanced
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TABLE 6-1. QP SOLUTIONS FOR VARIOUS FAILURES
FAILURE LEFT LEFT LEFT LEFT
ENGINE STABILATOR RUDDER ELEVATOR AILERON
SOLUTION -4251 LBS -8 DEG i0 DEG -12 DEG i0 DEG
STATE PERTURBATIONS:
Vx (f/s) -20 -20 2.9 -4.9 .08
Vz (f/s) 8.0 7.9 -1.2 2.0 -i.0
Q (r/s) 0 0 0 0 0
e (r/s) .036 .041 -.006 .01 -.005
Vy (f/s) 6.3 -5.4 Ii -2.7 5.4
P (r/s) 0 0 0 0 0
I
R (r/s) 0 0 0 0 0
(r) .049 -.018 .006 -.009 .017
CONTROL PERTURBATIONS:
LT (ibs) 0 -150 2750 24 -336
RT (ibs) 3113 -580 -2650 -200 130
LS (deg) 3.5 0 1.6 2.5 -.69
RS (deg) -3.0 3.5 -1.2 2.3 -.32
R (deg) -5.0 -1.5 0 -.81 1.7
LE (deg) 2.0 1.7 .26 0 -.II
RE (deg) -8.0 1.6 -.20 .36 -.05
LA (deg) 5.0 2.95 3.3 .80 0
RA (deg) -5.0 2.1 -3.8 .37 .28
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS
FOR CONVERGENCE: i0 3 2 i i
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by the control surfaces alone (i.e., forcing all states to remain unperturbed
and solving for a minimum J2 = JBu + wl). The use of attitude coupling is
particularly pronounced in the rudder failure case where a sideslip angle of
about 3 degrees results, and in the engine failure case where a bank angle of
2.8 degrees is maintained.
The effect of scaling is demonstrated by comparing Table 6-1 with Table
6-2. In Table 6-2 the same failure cases are used, but the scaling matrix S
is set equal to the identity (i.e., no scaling). For the rudder and engine
failures, two effects are clearly discernible. First, with no scaling (Table
6-2), the tendency is to use considerably more control-surface and attitude-
coupling perturbations with less thrust perturbations. This might be expected
since the scaled results (Table 6-1) put a smaller price on the use of thrust
perturbations. Also, in these two cases, several variables are at their
limits, and as a result, the number of iterations needed to find these solu-
tions is substantially greater than those in Table 6-1. In the other failure
cases, substantially smaller thrust perturbations appear as compared to Table
6-1, but the control surface and attitude coupling perturbations are not
affected as greatly as in the case of rudder and engine failures.
The above solutions provide some idea of the capabilities of the linear
trim algorithm for some fairly severe failure situations. In all cases
defined above, the feasible solution provided perfect disturbance rejection
capabilities (in the sense that Fz - d = 0 in Eq. 3-14). One of the issues
raised in early assessments of the restructurable control problem (e.g., see
[34]), was how the use of various nonstandard control surfaces would impact
the ability to recover a stable flight condition following a major failure.
The above results suggest that sufficient control authority among the normal
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TABLE 6-2. QP SOLUTIONS FOR VARIOUS FAILURES - NO SCALING
FAILURE LEFT LEFT LEFT LEFT
ENGINE STABILATOR RUDDER ELEVATOR AILERON
SOLUTION -4251 LBS -8 DEG i0 DEG -12 DEG I0 DEG
STATE PERTURBATIONS:
VX (f/s) -20 -12.9 -20 .07 5.3
Vz (f/s) 5.5 4.4 8.4 -.03 -3.1
Q (r/s) -.0O6 0 0 0 0
0 (r) .017 .02 .04 -.0002 -.01
Vy (f/s) 1.9 -6.3 15.8 -1.3 3.9
P (r/s) -.002 0 0 0 0
R (r/s) -.0002 0 0 0 0
(r) .03 -.018 .03 -.004 .01
CONTROL PERTURBATIONS:
LT (ibs) 0 -30 1510 -.01 -.21
RT (ibs) 2030 -30 -2140 -.01 -.2
LS (deg) 3.5 0 3.5 3.5 -2.6
RS (deg) -3.5 3.5 -3.0 1.8 2.4
R (deg) -5.0 -2.3 0 -.5 1.6
LE (deg) 1.6 2.0 2.0 0 -1.2
RE (deg) -8.0 2.0 -8.0 .87 1.2
LA (deg) 5.0 5.0 5.0 .99 0
RA (deg) 5.0 5.0 -5.0 -.93 -1.6
i
NI_ER OF ITERATIONS I
FOR CONVERGENCE: >30 6 9 2 I
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control elements seems to be available for rejecting the disturbances caused
by any single stuck or frozen control element failure. Therefore, the only
impact of using nonstandard control elements in the failure cases we have
examined would be in increasing the amount of remaining control authority of
the primary surfaces while maintaining the desired disturbance rejection capa-
bilities. We now demonstrate this effect by including the use of spoilers in
conjunction with the other surfaces in solving the trim problem.
Three issues which must be addressed before adding spoilers as a control
element in the trim problem are: (I) the nominal deflection value (about
which minimum perturbations will be sought), (2) the scale factor or weight
which will be used, and (3) the linear range of spoiler deflection.
While some advantage to using nonzero nominal spoiler deflections in the
trim problem exist (e.g., the ease with which these surfaces might be included
in a redesigned control system), such use is likely to result in spoiler de-
ployment upon a false failure alarm. While this may not be a major drawback,
_t would increase the burden on any executive control logic system for deter-
mining when spoiler deployment is desirable. Therefore, in the results that
follow, we will assume a nominal value of zero spoiler angle in which, if
there are no disturbances to reject, all of the unfailed nominal deflections
will be maintained.
In order to insure that the spoilers are used when a failure does exist,
their use must be made cheap by proper choice of their corresponding scale
factors. For example, we can guarantee that a full spoiler deflection (of say
i0 degrees) is used before, say, 0.5 degrees of another surface (if they would
produce the same disturbance rejection capabilities) by making the ratio of
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their scale factors 200:1. For example, a scale factor of 5 on other surfaces
gives a desired spoiler scale factor I000 degrees. Finally, to maintain model
accuracy, we must limit spoiler deflection to the range [0,8] degrees.
The augmented B matrix for the results that follow is
O.38E-O3 O.38E-03 0.0068 0.0068 0.0OOO 0.0032 0.0032 0.0036 0.0036 -O.0164 -0.0164 --
-0.29E-06 -0.29E-06 -0.1688 -0.1688 0.00OO -0.0809 -0.0809 -0.0904 -0.0904 O.1733 0.1733
O.63E-05 0.63E-05 -0.0221 -O.0221 0.0OOO -O.O106 -0.O106 -0.0028 -0.0028 0.0021 0.O021
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
B-
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1389 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005-0.0005 0.0262-0.0262
0.21Z-05-0.21£-050.0076-0.00740.0093 0.0036-0.0036 0.0082-0.0082-0.0X970.0197
0.12E-04 -0.12E-04 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0109 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0026 0.0026
__0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 O.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(6-87)
where the last two columns correspond to the estimated spoiler effectiveness.
Table 6-3 summarizes the result of applying the quadratic programming
algorithm with the spoiler-augmented B matrix to the linear trim problem for
the failure cases used in the previous discussion. Comparing Tables 6-1 and
6-3, we see that in the case of engine, rudder and aileron failures, the use
of spoilers, as expected, reduces the amount that the primary control surfaces
must contribute to the trim solution.
Summary
The results presented in this section demonstrate the operation of a
quadratic programming algorithm in the solution of the linear trim problem
for several failure cases of interest. The importance of scaling the solution
variables was demonstrated and it was seen that: (i) the amount of control
usage of one element relative to other elements (and the relative amount of
attitude coupling) could be modified by proper choice of scale factors, and
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TABLE 6-3. QP SOLUTIONS FOR VARIOUS FAILURES - WITH SPOILER DEFLECTIONS
FAILURE LEFT LEFT LEFT LEFT
ENGINE STABILATOR RUDDER ELEVATOR AILERON
SOLUTION -4251 LBS -8 DEG i0 DEG -12 DEG I0 DEG
STATE PERTURBATIONS:
Vx (f/s) -6.9 -20 1.33 -4.8 .92
Vz (f/s) 4.6 7.9 1.29 2.07 -.01
Q (deg/s) 0 0 0 0 0
8 (deg) 1.3 2.3 .32 .60 -.01
Vy (f/s) 9.25 -5.4 15.6 -1.9 .36
P (deg/s) 0 0 0 0 0
R (deg/s) 0 0 0 0 0
(deg) 3.93 -1.02 1.9 -.34 -.06
CONTROL PERTURBATIONS:
LT (Ibs) 0 -148 1815 9.6 129
RT (ibs) 4558 -577 -1222 -140 119
LS (deg) .80 0 .31 2.51 -.30
RS (deg) -1.3 3.50 .18 2.39 -.30
R (deg) -5.0 ! -1.51 0 -.52 -.13
LE (deg) .14 1.69 .05 0 -.05
RE (deg) -.23 1.63 .021 .37 -.05
LA (deg) 3.6 2.95 .35 .74 0
RA (deg) -2.0 2.10 -.12 .44 -.05
LSP (deg 0 0 0 0 4.90
RSP (deg) 8.0 0 8.0 .65 1.08
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS
FOR CONVERGENCE: 20 3 5 2 3
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(2) the number of iterations needed to obtain a solution is greatly influenced
by the particular choice of scale factors. In addition, the use of nonstan-
dard control elements was demonstrated by considering the addition of spoiler
control elements. In most cases, the addition of spoilers caused the resulting
solution to achieve the desired flight condition with smaller values of nominal
primary control surface perturbations.
6.4 LINEAR ANALYSIS OF CONTROL LAWS FOR STUCK FAILURES
In this subsection we present a brief summary of the results of an exten-
sive linear analysis of the control redesign procedure. The matrix of test
cases is shown in Table 6-4. For each test case, the closed-loop eigenvalues
were determined, the singular values of the loop transfer function (LTF) were
plotted versus frequency, a linear simulation of the aircraft response to
wind gusts was performed, step responses to stabilator and engine failures
were examined, and, in the correct redesign cases (4xx), the initial condi-
tlon response to a particular trim solution was found. In addition, wind
gust responses for the no-failure case were found. Note that in these trials
using the redesigned control law when there is no failure, is identical to the
case when there is a failure and it is correctly identified. The simulations
are all based on a linear rigid body approximation to the aircraft dynamics.
No actuator dynamics and no travel limits are imposed, however, in most cases,
the control surfaces remain within their saturation limits. Some character-
istic results are presented below.
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TABLE 6-4. MATRIX OF TEST CASES WITH MNEMONICS
NO CORRECT INCORRECT INCORRECT
REDESIGN REDESIGN REDESIGN REDESIGN
LT 3LT 4LT
LS 3LS 4LS 5LS/LE
R 3R 4R 5R/LA
LE 3LE 4LE 5LE/RE 5LE/LS
LA 3LA 4LA 5LA/R
LA & RA 3LARA 4LARA
LS & RS 3LSRS 4LSRS
LS & LE 3LSLE 4LSLE
Key: R/LT = Right/Left Engine 3XX = No Redesign Cases
R/LS = Right/Left Stabilizer 4xx = Correct Redesign Cases
R = Rudder 5xx = In Correct Redesign Cases
R/LE = Right/Left Elevator
R/LA = Right/Left Aileron
I01
Table 6-5 provides the eigenvalues (listed In order of decreasing real
part) for some of the no redesign and correct redesign cases (3xx and 4xx).
Note that no distinction between lateral and longitudinal modes is made in the
table since the aircraft does not, in general, decouple when a failure occurs.
For comparison, the open loop eigenvalues (including the 4 integrator states)
are:
Longitudinal Modes Lateral Modes
-.61 ± 1.5J (short period) -1.7 (roll subsidence)
-.017 ± .17 (phugold) -.058 ± l.lj (dutch roll)
0.0 (integrator) -.0063 (spiral) (6-88)
0.0 (integrator) 0.0 (integrator)
0.0 (integrator)
and the closed loop eigenvalues for the baseline design are
Longitudinal Modes Lateral Modes
-1.2 ± .97j -1.9
-I.i -i.i (6-89)
-.71 -.86 ± 1.5j
-.i0 ± .023j -.62 ± .50j
In Table 6-5, a * denotes elgenvalues which are significantly different with
the redesigned control law as compared to the nominal control law when the
corresponding failure is present.
The most striking result is for the rudder failure (test cases 3R and 4R).
With no redesign, one elgenvalue appears at -.007 r/s. Although this is close
to the open loop spiral mode, the eigenvector associated with this mode is
actually comprised mostly of the side velocity integrator state. The rede-
signed control law moves this mode to -.16 r/s which is presumably superior.
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TABLE 6-5. CLOSED LOOP EIGENVALUES FOR TEST CASES (3XX) AND (4XX)
i I
3LT 4LT 3LS 4LS 3R 4R
-1.9 -1.9 -1.9 -1.9 -1.9 -1.9
-1.2 _ .97J -1.2 _ .97J -1.1 -1.1 -1.2 ± .97J -1.2 ± .97]
-1.1 -1.1 -1.1 _ 1.2J -1.1 _ 1.1J -1.1 -1.1
-1.1 -1.1 -.85 _ 1.5J -.86 ± 1.5J -.71 -.71
-.86 ± 1.5J -.86 _ 1.5J -.65 _ .36J -.78 ± .14j* -.47 _ .54J -.50 ± .55J
-.72 -.71 -.56 _ .46J -.62 _ .48J* -.13 _ 1.1J -.18 _ l.lJ
-.62 ± .5J -.62 ± 0.Sj -.I ± .02J -.I _ .02J -.I0 ± .02J -.16"
-.082 -.085 -.007 -.I0 ± .02j
-.065 -.066
i
3LE 4LE l 3_ I 4LA
[
-1.9 -1.9 -1.8 -1.8
-1.1 -1.1 _ 1.1j -1.2 ± .99J -1.2 ± .98j
-1.I ± 1.2j -1.1 -1.1 i -1.1
-.85 ± l.SJ -.86 _ l.Sj -I.0 -I.0
-.66 Z .34j -.79 ± .12j* -.82 Z 1.5j -.86 _ 1.5j
-.56 _ .47j -.61 ± .49J -.74 -.73
-.I0 _ .02j -.I0 _ .02J -.44 _ .46j -.60 ± .42j*
-.I0 _ .02j -.I0 _ .02j
I
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The wind gust response for these (rudder failure) cases shows slightly better
regulation of bank angle with the redesigned control law, although in both
deslgns, the oscillations are not desirable and much larger than the gust
response of the unfailed aircraft with the nominal control law. This is shown
in Figs. 6-9 through 6-11. Although the bank angle appears divergent in Figs.
6-10 and 6-11, it is actually reasonably regulated when the simulation is run
for longer time periods. With the redesigned control law, any improvement
in regulation is accomplished through the increased use of differential ele-
vators, stabilators and throttle. It appears that differential aileron is
used in the same manner for both cases 3R and 4R.
Table 6-6 shows the closed loop eigenvalues for several combinations of
stuck failures. For the failure of both ailerons (test cases 3LARA and 4LARA),
the eigenvalue at -.84 ± .05j with no redesign becomes overdamped at -i.0
and -.98 when the redesigned control law is implemented. In the other cases,
underdamped modes with no redesign become better damped when the redesigned
control law is used. In addition, it is interesting to note that in many
cases, the redesigned eivenvalues revert back closer to the original baseline
eigenvalues than do the non-redesigned eivenvalues. The wind gust responses
for cases 3LSLE and 4LSLE show that better regulation of forward velocity (u)
is achieved with the redesigned control law and that this is accomplished
through the increased use of collective ailerons and throttle. Figures 6-12
and 6-13 compare the velocity regulation performance of the nominal and rede-
signed control law with stuck left stabilator and left elevator•
The step response of the closed loop system to a hard-over failure is
given by
x = (A-BG)x + w (6-90)
104
where x is the perturbation of the state variables from their unfailed trim
values, w is the step disturbance caused by a hard-over failure (see Eq. 6-76),
B is the effectiveness matrix for the failed aircraft, and G is the feedback
gain. Figures 6-14 and 6-15 compare the response to a failed throttle using
the nominal feedback gain (no restructuring) and the feedback gain determined
by the control resdeslgn procedure. Surprisingly, the aircraft seems to
recover from the failure without saturation of any control element even with
no control law redesign. The maximum angle of attack during this recovery is
3.5 degrees and the maximum bank angle is about i degree. Forward velocity
is reduced by about 8 fps before it begins to increase. With the redesigned
control law, the most noticable effect is the slightly decreased use of rudder
and aileron controls during recovery.
The step response to a stabilator runaway (both stabilators hard-over to
their negative limit) was also examined. In both the cases (redesign and no
redesign) recovery is accomplished only by exceeding the saturation limits of
the elevators. When the feedforward trim solution is applied for this case,
recovery is accomplished without saturation of the elevators, however, the
remaining throttle is initia!ly retarded to zero thrust which, presumably,
violates allowable operation. Further examination of these cases appears in
Section 7, where they are simulated on a nonlinear aircraft model which includes
the various surface travel and rate limits as well as actuator dynamics.
Finally, Table 6-7 shows the closed loop eigenvalues for several misclas-
sification cases. That is, the actual control effectiveness (B matrix) corre-
sponds to one failure, buu the control law redesign is implemented for another.
The net effect of a misclassiflcation is to remove both the surface which is
failed and the surface which is identified as failed from use in the redesigned
105
control system. As a result, the elgenvalues in Table 6-6 tend to resemble
the cases corresponding to a failure with no redesign. This is particularly
evident for case 5R/LA where we see the integrator mode at -.008 r/s which is
very close to the mode at -.007 for case 3R.
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Figure 6-9. Gust Response for No Failure and Nominal Control Law
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Figure 6-11. Gust Response for Rudder Failure with Redesigned Control Law
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TABLE 6-6. CLOSED LOOP EIGENVALUES FOR COMBINED FAILURE TEST CASES
-1.7 -1.7 -1.8 -1.8 -1.9 -1.9
-1.2 -1.2 ± .98j -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
-1.2 ± 1.021 -1.0 _ -.87 ± 1.3J -1.0 ± 1.2J -.90 ± 1.3j -1.0 + 1.121
-.84 _- .0521 -.98" -.85 ± l.SJ -.86 4"1.5J -.83 ± 1.5J -.86 + 1.5J
-.73
-.80 *- l.Sj -.87 ± 1.5j -.55 ± .49j -.69 _- .22j* -.65 -+ .44j -.66 -+ .24j
-.26 -_ .35j -.59 ± .24j* -.45 -+ .39j -.61 -+ .47j* -.36 -+ .41J -.63 -+ .45j*
-.iO ± .02J -.I0 +- .02j -.I0 -_ .02J -.I0 +- .02j -.I0 -+ .02J -.IO -+ .O2J
TABLE 6-7. CLOSED LOOP EIGENVALUES FOR MISCLASSIFICATION CASES (5XX)
5LE/RE 5LE/LS 5LS/LE 5R/LA 5LA/R
-1.8 -1.9 -1.9 -1.8 -1.8
-I.I -I.I -I.I -1.2 t .98j -1.2 ± .99j
-.96 m 1.3j -.95 _ 1.321 -.95 ± 1.3J -I.0 -l.O
-.85 _ l.SJ -.84 ± 1.5J -.84 _ 1.5j -.72 -.74
-.58 ± .46j -.65 _ .43j -.65 _ .43j -.41 ± .48j -.33 t .5OJ
-.57 ± .3721 -.14 ± .4OJ -.43 ± .40J -.II ± l.lj -.15 ± l.lJ
-.10 _ .0221 -.I0 t .02J .lO ± .02j -.lO ± .0221 -.16
-.008 -.10 ± .02j
ll4
SECTION 7
SIMULATION RESULTS
The performance of the restructurable flight control system (RFCS)
described in Section 5 was tested at the NASA Langley Research Center using
that facility's modified B-737 aircraft (batch) simulation. This simulation
was chosen because of its extensive capabilities for simulating realistic
responses (during normal and failed flight) of the B-737 aircraft. Models
of this aircraft were used during this project for design and evaluation of
the RFCS concept and it is anticipated that some limited flight tests on
NASA's Advanced Transport Operations (ATOPS) B-737 aircraft may be possible.
A summary of the simulation's capabilities and the test results is presented
next. This is then followed by a more detailed description of the full test
plan and a discussion of some of the more interesting results.
7.1 Sb_RY
The capabilities of the simulation which are relevant to this project
are listed in Table 7-1. The simulation is based on the 6 degree of freedom
equations of motion for a rigid body driven by aerodynamic, propulsive, and
gravity forces. The aerodynamic model is nonlinear and, for this project,
could not be altered. Full independent control authority is available and
realistic actuator models including rate and travel limits are employed. The
control system described in subsection 6.2 was implemented with the capability
to change the control gains and the nominal "trim" values at any preselected
I15
TABLE 7-1. CAPABILITIES OF NASA's MODIFIED B-737 SIMULATION
6 DOF R_gld body Equations
Nonlinear Aerodynamic Model
Independent Control Authority
Actuator Models (Rate and Travel Limits)
Control System
Command Generation
Sensor Noise
Wind Gusts
Failures
times during the simulation. All control redesign and trim calculations were
made off-line for the selected failure cases. A command generator which pro-
vided steps and ramps of commanded pitch angle, bank angle, sideslip, and
longitudinal velocity was also made implemented. Finally, the simulation
had the capability to simulate stuck (at last value) and hard-over (runaway)
failures including engine out conditions.
There were three important general results that were observed. First,
the nontraditional use of traditional control surfaces in a nominal feedback
control system to spread control authority amongst many redundant (in terms
of the forces and moments which can be produced) control elements provided
a significant amount of fault tolerance without any use of restructuring
techniques. In most single element failures, "recovery" was automatically
achieved and little loss in command response performance was observed. A
stuck rudder failure provided the most challenging single element failure
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situation since it is used extensively for damping the dutch roll mode and
since generation of side force is generally not possible with the other con-
trol elements.
Secondly, the use of new feedback gains (provided by the feedback control
redesign procedure) following a failure, alone can provide significantly
improved recovery as long as the control elements remain within their travel
limits and as long as uncertainty about the failure identity is properly
handled. This effect is particularly evident in the stuck rudder failure case.
When control elements reach their travel limits during a failure, performance
generally degrades as expected. In failure cases where the nominal control
system performed well by itself, the application of redesigned feedback gains
resulted in little, if any improvement. However, when a failure is misclassi-
fied and feedback control redesign is based on the incorrect control element,
potentially severe performance degradation can take place. By embedding FDI
uncertainty in the redesign procedure, significantly better performance is
achieved (over the misclassified failure case) although it is clear that cor-
rect failure identification (and subsequent application of redesigned feedback
gains) provides the best performance during failures.
Finally, the use of the feedforward trim solution in conjunction with
redesigned feedback gains, allows recovery to take place in most cases, even
when significant control saturation occurs. This is generally due to the fact
that any servo errors resulting from a failure are quickly reduced by appli-
cation of the feedforward trim solution. Since the redesigned control system
stabilizes the aircraft and the servo errors remain small due to the feed-
forward trim, recovery is generally achieved even when many control elements
reach and remain at their travel limits.
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7.2 IMPLEMENTATION AND TEST PLAN DETAILS
In all of the results to be subsequently presented, the following assump-
tlons were made.
I. All simulation runs were begun in the nominal configuration
defined in subsection 6.1. The nominal trim values (Xo,Uo)
initially applied to the aircraft are given by Eqs. 6-74
and 6-75.
2. In order to handle windup of the integrator states during
control saturation, Eqs. 6-70 and 6-71 are modified to:
Xl = GI (Y - Yo - r) (7-1)
u = uo - Grx r - Gy(y - Yo - r) - xI (7-2)
Since there is, now, one integrator state per control element,
when a particular control reaches its travel limit, the cor-
responding integrator state is held at its last value until
the corresponding control comes out of saturation.
3. In most cases (except where noted in subsection 7.3) the
travel limits on each control element are given by their
allowable perturbations from trim and take the following
values•
Stabilator limits (-9 to 8 degrees)
Elevator limits (±20 degrees)
Aileron limits (110 degrees)
Rudder limits (±i0 degrees)
Spoiler limits (0 to 40 degrees)
Throttle limits (-i0 to 40 degrees)
4. All applications of the redesign technique (except where
noted) were implemented by setting the column of the B
matrix defined in Eq. 6-5 corresponding to the failed
control element equal to zero.
5. Finally, the definitions and values used in solving the
trim problem are (except where noted) given by Eqs. 6-82
through 6-87.
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The overall test plan was designed to demonstrate the ability of the
aircraft to recover from a failure and follow subsequent commands under the
following conditions.
I. No redesign (nominal feedback system only),
2. Gains only (application of redesigned feedback gains at the
time of failure),
3. Gains and Trim (application of redesigned feedback gains
and feedforward trim values at the time of failure),
4. FDI delay (application of gains and trim at seledcted times
following a failure),
5. FDI mlsclasslficatlon (application of redesigned control
gains for an unfailed control at the time of failure and
use of uncertainty in the redesign technique),
6. Spoilers (use of spoilers in the solution of the trim problem
and application of gains and trim values at the time of
failure.
Each of these "test cases" were examined for a variety of failure modes
including:
I. Individual stuck surfaces (left or right stabilator, elevator,
aileron and rudder),
2. Stabilator runaway (runaway up and runaway down),
3. Engine out,
4. Combinations of stuck failures.
In the next subsection, we present some of the more interesting results which
provide substantiation for the conclusions drawn in subsection 7.1.
7.3 DETAILED RESULTS
For single element stuck failures (including the engine out failure),
the nominal LQ control system performed quite well, both in terms of recovery
and subsequent command following.
119
Figure 7-1 shows the command responses for a bank-sldeslip-pitch maneuver
for the unfailed aircraft (7-1a) and with the left elevator stuck at 3.6
degrees at t = 4 seconds (7-1b). We notice very little effect in the bank
response (4) during the bank maneuver in which the failure occurred or In
the subsequent sideslip response. The pitch response with the left elevator
failure shows slightly greater coupling during these lateral maneuvers but
follows the pitch command nearly as well as with no failure. Surprisingly,
little coupling in the lateral axis occurs during the pitch maneuver with
the stuck elevator failure. Figures 7-2 and 7-3 show the control usage for
the no-failure and left elevator stuck failure cases, respectively. Notice
that the disturbance caused by the stuck off-centered elevator is compensated
by a small amount of differential stabilator which is not present when there
is no failure.
Figures 7-4 through 7-7 examine the impact of a stuck rudder failure
occurring during a sideslip maneuver. Figure 7-4 shows the unfailed responses
to the baseline sidesllp-bank-pltch maneuver sequence. Figure 7-5 and 7-6 show
the sideslip (8) and bank (4) responses for a stuck rudder fallure occurring
at about t = 3 seconds (stuck off-center at about 7 degrees) for a variety of
test cases. With no reconfiguratlon, we see signficant dutch roll oscilla-
tions as expected from the linear analyses of Section 6. Significant residual
sideslip is still present at t = 60 secs. (about 55 secs. following the 8 = 0
command). The bank maneuver is performed with some loss in performance due to
the fact that the ailerons become saturated. This occurs because of the slg-
nlflcant use of ailerons to counteract the rolling moment of the stuck rudder.
A roll command in the opposite direction, would, of course, not cause aileron
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saturation and presumably result in much improved performance. When the rede-
signed feedback control gains are employed, we see that, although the dutch
roll oscillations are still not adequately damped (as expected from Section 6
analyses), B is eventually reduced to near zero. During the bank maneuver,
coordination is not maintained as desired, but the roll response is much im-
proved due to the fact that the ailerons no longer saturate. This is because
the redesigned control law makes greater use of differential elevator and sta-
bilator in rolling the aircraft to compensate for the lost rudder. When we
employ a feedforward trim (implemented at the time of failure assuming perfect
FDI) we see small changes in the B and _ responses. However, the control
usage is drastically altered, in general, keeping the stabilators and elevators
further from their limits and making more use of differential throttle to
compensate for the yawing moment induced by the stuck rudder. Note that two
trim cases were examined. In the first case, _ was constrained as described
in subsection 6.3 whereas in the second case, B = 0 was added as a condition
for feasible trim. The trim solution in both cases was feasible (zero error)
however, it is clear that the control usage is drastically different in these
two cases. Finally, Fig. 7-7 shows the throttle responses for the various
test cases. From this figure it is clear that the (steady state) reduction
in B error following a failure is due to the increased use of differential
throttle controls in the reconfigured cases.
Figure 7-8 through 7-13 deal with a stabilator runaway failure occurring
during the normal landing approach (no command generation). In each of these
cases, both stabilator panels are slewed to their negative limits (trailing
edge up) at about t = 3 seconds. Also, we employed elevator travel limits of
±15 degrees (instead of ±20 degree limits assumed in other runs). Figure 7-8
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Figure 7-9. Stabilator Runaway - Gains Only
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Figure 7-10. Stabilator Runaway - Gains and Trim
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Figure 7-11. Stabilator Runaway - Gains and Trim Delayed by i Sec
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Figure 7-12. Stabilator Runaway - Gains and Trim Delayed by 3 Sec
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Figure 7-13. Stabi1ator Runaway - Gains and Trim Delayed by 10 Sec
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shows various responses to the failure with no reconfiguration. A very high
pitch attitude (e) is reached before it begins decreasing with what appears
to be a stable phugoid oscillation. The high pitch attitude is accompanied
by a reduction of almost 20 knots in airspeed. This reduction comes very
close to the stall speed of the aircraft and at that time both elevators and
both ailerons are at their travel limits. No use of throttle is made because
of the "conflicting" (at least in terms of throttle usage in the nominal con-
trol system) elements of positive pitch error and negative airspeed error.
The use of redesigned feedback control gains by themselves provides little
help in this case as shown in Fig. 7-9. The problem is that, by design, we
can expect no faster responses from the redesigned control law (the bandwidth
limits of the original design are maintained) and all control elements, except
the throttle, reach their saturation limits fairly quickly. The throttle can-
not, of course, be used alone to recover from the dangerous near stall condi-
tion and is therefore not used in the redesigned control law. When we add the "
feedforward trim to the RFCS solution, a very reasonable recovery is achieved.
This is shown in Fig. 7-10. Notice that while the elevators saturate in this
case too (the trim solution is infeasible), the increased use of elevators,
ailerons and a throttle reduction, keeps the pitch attitude error from getting
very large. The velocity is kept large enough to easily avoid a stall by
its regulation to a new trim value of -11.8 knots below the old trim value.
Notice that the steady-state pitch attitude and velocity are different than
the unfailed trim case but that the flight path angle (y = -3) degrees) is
maintained reasonably well.
In Figs. 7-11 through 7-12, we investigated the effect of FDI delay by
varying the time at which reconfiguration (application of redesigned feedback
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control gains and feedforward trim) takes place. Figure 7-11 contains a 1
second delay (before any of the control elements saturate), Fig. 7-12 contains
a 3 second delay (after the elevators but before the ailerons saturate) and
Fig. 7-13 contains a I0 second delay (after both ailerons and elevators). As
expected, recovery performance degrades with increasing FDI delay, however,
in all eases, performance is better than without reconfiguration. Even with
a I0 second delay (Fig. 7-13), application of the feedforward trim solution
causes the throttle to be initially reduced which results in reduction of the
pitch error before the airspeed is decreased too much. The change of sign in
the pitch error then causes the elevator to come out of saturation to recover
the new pitch trim while the throttle is being increased to recover the new
airspeed trim. This nonstandard combination of control use to avoid stalling
the aircraft during a stabilator runaway, may be an obvious solution in retro-
spect. However, the ability to have this solution available, automatically,
to any pilot is an exciting advance in the potential for increased aviation
safety.
In the last set of tests, we examined the impact of uncertainty in the
FDI algorithm. Figure 7-14 shows various responses to a left elevator failure
(see Figs. 7-1 through 7-3 for baseline cases) for three different "uncertainty"
cases. The first plot in each series corresponds to an FDI misclassification
in which the left and right ailerons are declared failed instead of the left
elevator. We then implement only the feedback control gains corresponding to
a left and right aileron failure. In the second plot of each series we assume
a naive method of accounting for FDI uncertainty. In this case, since there
is, by assumption, confusion between three possible failure modes (left ele-
vator and left and right aileron) we use the feedback gains corresponding to
136
5 c ,
<> q
G. deg
q. deg
-s
5
G. deg
q. deg
-5
5
e. deg
q. deg
-s
Figure 7-14a. Pitch Responses - Uncertain FDI
I ==== I
I I
55 60
R-3201
504540
( I I
25 30 35
Time, sec
2015105
10
ACAS. knots
0
-10
10
ACAS, knots
0
-10
ACAS, knots I
-1ol
I
0
Figure 7-14b. ACAS Responses - Uncertain FDI
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failure of all three surfaces. Finally, in the last plot of each series, we
examine the efficacy of utilizing knowledge of uncertainty in the redesign
method (see Section 4). In the first two cases, the important responses are
fairly wild. This is, in part, due to the fact that we have three surfaces
which are not being used for both of these cases. In the last case, we
assumed the following:
I. The probability that the left elevator is failed (stuck)
P6, is .5,
2. The probability that the left or right a11erons are failed
(stuck), P7 and PS, are .25,
3. The expected value of the true B matrix is Bo (the unfailed
B matrix; note that this is formally inconsistent with the
assumptions I and 2, but can be justified on other grounds).
These three assumptions allow us to form the required sta-
tistics described in Section 4 for computing a redesigned
control law. In particular, we have (see Eqs. 4-17 and 4-19),
Bf = Bo
I 0 for j € i
_kilj =
_j2 . Bol j . Bok j otherwise
_j = pj(l-pj)
where j is the index corresponding to the potentially
failed surfaces.
The resulting performance in the last case is clearly superior to either
of the previous cases. This is due to that fact that all potentially failed
surfaces have nonzero gains (as expected). Comparing this case to Figs. 7-1
and 7-3, we see that the command responses are virtually the same as when no
redesign takes place, however, the control use in achieving these responses
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is quite different. It is anticipated that in more severe cases (e.g., for
unstable alrcraft) that the use of the knowledge about FDI uncertainty in the
control redesign algorithm would show more dramatic performance improvements
as compared to the no-redeslgn case as well as in comparison to FDI m_sclas-
slficatlon cases.
140
SECTION 8
CONCLUSIONS
This report has presented the results of the last year in a two-year
effort to develop an automatic control redesign procedure for restructurable
aircraft control. During the first year of the project, a redesign technique
was developed for the feedback portion of the flight control system. During
the second year, this system was tested and integrated with a feedforward
system for automatically trimming the aircraft to remove the known portion
of the failure-induced force and moment imbalances. The complete system was
tested on a nonlinear simulation of a Boeing 737 aircraft that was modified
to permit individual control surface motion.
Three important general results were observed. First, the nontraditional
use of standard control surfaces in a nominal feedback control system to
spread control authority amongst many redundant (in terms of the forces and
moments which can be produced) control elements provided a significant amount
of fault tolerance without any use of restructuring techniques. In most single
element failures, "recovery" was automatically achieved and little loss in
command response performance was observed. A stuck rudder failure provided
the most challenging single element failure situation since it is used exten-
sively for damping the dutch roll mode and since only weak side forces are
produced by the other control elements.
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Secondly, the use of new feedback galns alone (from the feedback control
redesign procedure but without retrlmming) following a failure can provide
slgnlflcantly Improved recovery as long as the control elements remain within
their travel limits and as long as uncertalnty about the failure identity is
properly handled. This effect is particularly evident in the stuck rudder
failure case. When control elements reach their travel limits during a fail-
ure, performance generally degrades as expected. In failure cases where the
nominal control system performed well by itself, the application of redesigned
feedback gains resulted in little, if any, improvement.
Finally, the use of the feedforward trim solution, in conjunction with
redesigned feedback gains, allows recovery to take place even when signifi-
cant control saturation occurs. This is generally due to the fact that servo
errors resulting from a failure are quickly reduced by application of the
feedforward trim solution. Since the redesigned control system stabilizes
the aircraft and the servo errors remain small due to the feedforward trim,
recovery is generally achieved even when many control elements reach and
remain at their travel limits.
In summary, the results to date indicate that the combination of a robust
nominal controller with an on-line redesign system can accommodate a variety
of failures and result in a safe stable aircraft. The major program objective
of developing the control design components of a restructurable control system
have been met.
8.1 .RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
Several steps remain, however, before a complete restructuring system
can be implemented. The first is the integration of the redesign system with
142
a Failure Detection and Identification (FDI) system. This integration is the
subject of the next phase of this project.
Other issues which need to be addressed in the future include
I. The need to model the post-failure aircraft,
2. The need to design the nominal controller, the FDI system, and
the redesign sysem as a coordinated, fault tolerant whole,
3. The need to integrate the fault tolerant control system
(including redesign components) with the rest of the aircraft
design process, and
4. The need to verify emergency performance.
The first issue refers to the need for post-failure aircraft models in the
redesign system. Although this system is designed to work with uncertain
aircraft models, and could therefore use stored approximate models for a
variety of anticipated failures, it can also take advantage of the better
information which might be available after failure from the use of parameter
identification procedures. The concepts used to detect and identify the
failures, explicitly address many problems which are inherent to identifica-
tion procedures. These procedures should also be useful for estimating the
failure effects as well.
The second issue results from the differing abilities of each part of the
fault tolerant control system for handling different failures. For example,
those failures which can be handled by passive robustness are likely to be
the hardest to detect and identify, since the aircraft performance will not
be seriously affected. Conversely, those failures which result in serious
performance degradation are also the easiest to find quickly. Such concerns
point to the need to develop a methodology for designing all the fault tolerant
controller components in a coordinated manner, so that failures not covered
by one part of the system can be accommodated by another.
143
Third, the incorporation of a restructurable control system in an air-
craft must be integrated with the rest of the aircraft design. For example,
if differential elevator control is incorporated in an aircraft design for
emergency use in restructuring, then the aircraft structure must be designed
to accommodate it. This leads to a conflict between designing for normal
operation and building in margins for emergency use. Although our restruc-
turing system can accommodate limits on control authority (much as it handles
bandwidth or travel limitations), the aircraft designer will need to trade
off the cost of such limits in terms of failure coverage against the cost in
structure. Tools to accomplish this multidlsciplinary trade-off will be
needed.
Finally, the restructurable control system will need to be flight tested
to investigate its performance under real-world conditions. An important
issue in such testing (and in subsequent validation of production designs) is
the simulation of failures and their effects. Such testing under realistic
conditions is essential to demonstrate the technology and bring it out of the
research stage.
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